Imported from bedkillerspacex-boop/codex-skill-library (
rubeus-lab-notes/SKILL.md). Install upstream withnpx skills add bedkillerspacex-boop/codex-skill-library --skill rubeus-lab-notes. Copyright stays with the author.
Rubeus Lab Notes
Scope And Authorization
- In scope: AD lab forests you own, CTF AD ranges, or engagements where Kerberos tool use is explicitly authorized.
- Out of scope: production AD without written approval; attacking third-party domains; using stolen tickets outside scope.
- Prefer snapshot-able lab DCs; coordinate blue team if purple-team.
- Tickets and hashes are credentials — encrypt evidence; purge after exercise.
- Pair poisoning labs with
responder-lab-only; Windows host privesc withwindows-privilege-escalationonly when authorized.
When To Use
- Learning Kerberos flows with a well-known lab tool surface (Rubeus).
- Authorized AD assessment where Rubeus is approved in RoE.
- Validating detections for TGT/TGS requests, ticket injection, or delegation abuse in lab.
- Documenting safe command patterns for internal training (never copy into unauthorized ops).
Do Not Use As Primary
| Need | Skill instead |
|---|---|
| LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning lab | responder-lab-only |
| Broad engagement methodology | recon-and-methodology |
| Linux privesc | linux-privilege-escalation |
| Generic Windows privesc | windows-privilege-escalation |
| Production AD hardening program | dedicated AD security architecture skills |
Kerberos concepts (lab map)
| Item | Role |
|---|---|
| TGT | Ticket-granting ticket from AS |
| TGS | Service ticket from TGS |
| SPN | Service principal for Kerberoasting scenarios |
| PAC | Authorization data in tickets |
| Delegation | S4U / constrained/unconstrained themes |
| PTH/PTT | Pass-the-hash / pass-the-ticket styles |
Rubeus is a post-compromise / credential lab tool — obtain legal foothold first per RoE.
Common lab verb map (illustrative)
Exact flags change by Rubeus version — always
--helpon your build. Below is conceptual orientation, not a copy-paste attack pack against real orgs.
| Verb area | Lab learning goal |
|---|---|
asktgt |
Request TGT with password/hash/cert in lab user context |
asktgs |
Request service tickets for lab SPNs |
ptt |
Inject ticket into session for lab resource access demos |
harvest / monitor |
Observe tickets on lab machine (authorized) |
s4u |
Study constrained delegation abuse paths in vulnerable lab configs |
| Kerberoast-related | Request TGS for crackable lab SPNs offline |
# Pattern only — run solely in authorized lab
Rubeus.exe <verb> /help
Workflow
1. Lab preflight
- Confirm domain: lab FQDN, DC IPs, test users, intentionally weak configs documented.
- Snapshot DC and attacker workstation.
- Sync clock (Kerberos is time-sensitive) via lab NTP.
- Define success: demonstrate technique + detection note — not “own everything quietly”.
2. Baseline authentication path
- Normal interactive login to lab user; capture expected event logs (4624, Kerberos 4768/4769 in lab policy).
- Note supported etypes (AES vs RC4 lab settings).
3. Exercise one technique at a time
- Start with asktgt for a lab user you control.
- Use tickets only against lab SPNs/hosts.
- Record commands, timestamps, and resulting log events for blue notes.
- Reset user passwords/tickets between scenarios if needed for cleanliness.
4. Opsec & safety (even in lab)
- Avoid tooling that spreads beyond lab VLANs.
- Do not reuse lab passwords on real accounts.
- Separate training notes from production runbooks that lack authorization gates.
5. Defensive observations (required learning output)
| Activity | Detection directions |
|---|---|
| Unusual TGS volume | 4769 spikes for many SPNs |
| RC4 usage | Etype anomalies if AES expected |
| Ticket injection | Unexpected logon patterns / sensitive privilege use |
| Delegation abuse | Auth to services without interactive user present |
| Offline crack | Protect SPN accounts with strong passwords / gMSA |
Hardening themes: least privilege, gMSA for services, disable weak etypes carefully, monitor delegation objects, tier admin model.
6. Evidence handling
- Export lab tickets only to encrypted store.
- Redact in screenshots for external sharing.
- Destroy at end of course/engagement.
7. Teardown
- Revert snapshots; rotate lab krbtgt if exercise requires (lab runbook).
- Remove persistence if any scenario created it.
- Write short after-action: technique, logs, control gaps.
Good / Bad
| Topic | Good | Bad |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Lab forest / RoE | Random customer AD |
| Learning | Pair offense + detections | Offense-only loot flex |
| Creds | Lab-only passwords | Real employee passwords |
| Commands | Versioned help-checked | Blind copy from old blogs on prod |
| Evidence | Encrypted, purged | Public paste of .kirbi |
| Time | NTP synced lab | Mystery KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW chaos |
Output Checklist
- Authorization/lab isolation confirmed
- Snapshots and NTP ready
- Technique exercised with recorded commands (lab only)
- Defensive log/detection notes captured
- Tickets/hashes secured then destroyed
- Teardown/revert completed
- No production spillover
- Training notes include authorization warnings
Rules
- Authorized lab/AD only — Rubeus is dual-use; default deny.
- Do not provide or use this as a guide for unauthorized Kerberos attacks.
- Prefer detection and hardening outcomes alongside offensive demos.
- Treat tickets as credentials equivalent to passwords.
- Keep tool versions and flags verified against your binary’s help text.