Imported from jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace (plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/SKILL.md). Install upstream with npx skills add jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace --skill detecting-eval-exec-usage. Copyright stays with the author (MIT).

Detecting eval / exec Usage

Name: detecting-eval-exec-usage
Author: jeremylongshore

Overview

Dynamic-code-execution APIs (CWE-95 Eval Injection) let an application interpret a string as code at runtime. If the string contains anything user-controllable, the application has handed the attacker arbitrary code execution.

The defensive posture: don't use these APIs. The exceptions are narrow: rule engines, formula evaluators (spreadsheet = formulas), plugin systems with explicit sandboxing. For everything else, there's almost always a safer alternative.

When the skill produces findings

Finding	Severity	Threshold	Affected control
Python `eval(...)` with non-literal	CRITICAL	argument contains var ref	CWE-95
Python `exec(...)` with non-literal	CRITICAL	argument contains var ref	CWE-95
Python `compile(...)` with non-literal	HIGH	source string contains var	CWE-95
Python `__import__(var)`	HIGH	dynamic module loading	CWE-95
JS `eval(...)`	CRITICAL	any	CWE-95
JS `new Function(str)`	CRITICAL	any non-literal	CWE-95
JS `setTimeout/setInterval(string)`	HIGH	string instead of function	CWE-95
Ruby `eval(...)`/`instance_eval(...)`/`class_eval(...)`	CRITICAL	non-literal	CWE-95
PHP `eval(...)`	CRITICAL	always	CWE-95
PHP `assert($str)`	CRITICAL	(legacy code-eval form)	CWE-95
PHP `create_function`	CRITICAL	deprecated, eval-equivalent	CWE-95
Java `ScriptEngineManager` + eval	HIGH	dynamic script execution	CWE-95
C# `Activator.CreateInstance(Type.GetType(str))`	HIGH	type loading from string	CWE-95

Prerequisites

Python 3.9+
Source tree on local filesystem

Instructions

Run

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/scripts/scan_eval.py /path/to/repo

Options: --output FILE, --format json|jsonl|markdown, --min-severity, --include-tests, --languages LIST.

Interpret

CRITICAL = direct RCE vector. Replace the dynamic execution with explicit logic (lookup table, switch statement) or a sandboxed expression library (Python simpleeval, JavaScript expr-eval, Ruby Dentaku).

Remediation

See references/PLAYBOOK.md.

Examples

Pre-commit

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/scripts/scan_eval.py \
    --min-severity high $(git diff --name-only main...HEAD | tr '\n' ' ')

CI

- run: |
    python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/scripts/scan_eval.py \
        . --min-severity high

Output

JSON / JSONL / Markdown. Exit codes: 0 / 1 / 2.

Error Handling

False positive on eval("'literal'") — the value is a constant string. Verify the regex match by reading the source line.

Resources

references/THEORY.md — Why dynamic-code execution is the highest-impact injection class, sandbox limits, the formula-evaluator design pattern
references/PLAYBOOK.md — Per-language safe alternatives (Python simpleeval / ast.literal_eval, JS expression-eval libraries, Ruby Dentaku, Java scripting sandboxes)

{ "ocm": "1", "id": "jeremylongshore-tons-of-skills-marketplace-detecting-eva-09c521", "kind": "skill", "name": "detecting-eval-exec-usage", "description": "Scan a source tree for dynamic-code-execution APIs that an attacker can hijack: Python eval / exec / compile, JavaScript eval / Function() / setTimeout(string), Ruby eval / instance_eval / class_eval, Java ScriptEngine, PHP eval / assert($str), .NET Activator.CreateInstance / Reflection.Emit with dynamic input. Use when: pre-commit gate on any application that parses user-uploaded code (rule engines, formula evaluators, plugin systems), or post-bug-report when \"we run user-supplied expressions.\" Threshold: any call to eval / exec / Function / similar where the argument is not a string literal. Trigger with: \"scan eval\", \"find dynamic exec\", \"audit eval calls\", \"code injection patterns\".", "publisher": "jeremylongshore", "version": "1.0.0", "capabilities": { "domains": [ "coding" ], "tags": [ "skill-md", "security", "static-analysis", "code-injection", "pentest", "skills-sh" ], "languages": [ "en" ] }, "quality_prior": 0.6, "examples": [ "Scan a source tree for dynamic-code-execution APIs that an attacker can hijack: Python eval / exec / compile, JavaScript eval / Function() / setTimeout(string), Ruby eval / instance_eval / class_eval, Java ScriptEngine, PHP eval / assert($str), .NET Activator.CreateInstance / Reflection.Emit with dynamic input. Use when: pre-commit gate on any application that parses user-uploaded code (rule engines, formula evaluators, plugin systems), or post-bug-report when \"we run user-supplied expressions.\" Threshold: any call to eval / exec / Function / similar where the argument is not a string literal. Trigger with: \"scan eval\", \"find dynamic exec\", \"audit eval calls\", \"code injection patterns\"." ], "primary": false, "metadata": { "source": { "provider": "skills.sh", "repository": "https://github.com/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace", "path": "plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/SKILL.md", "ref": "HEAD", "url": "https://github.com/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/blob/HEAD/plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/SKILL.md", "key": "jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/SKILL.md" }, "compatibility": "Designed for Claude Code", "allowed_tools": [ "Read", "Bash(python3:*)", "Glob", "Grep" ], "license": "MIT" }, "instructions": "# Detecting eval / exec Usage\n\n## Overview\n\nDynamic-code-execution APIs (CWE-95 Eval Injection) let an\napplication interpret a string as code at runtime. If the string\ncontains anything user-controllable, the application has handed\nthe attacker arbitrary code execution.\n\nThe defensive posture: don't use these APIs. The exceptions are\nnarrow: rule engines, formula evaluators (spreadsheet `=` formulas),\nplugin systems with explicit sandboxing. For everything else,\nthere's almost always a safer alternative.\n\n## When the skill produces findings\n\n| Finding | Severity | Threshold | Affected control ", "cost": { "context_tokens": 791 } }

detecting-eval-exec-usage

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