Imported from jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace (plugins/saas-packs/podium-pack/skills/podium-multi-location-router/SKILL.md). Install upstream with npx skills add jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace --skill podium-multi-location-router. Copyright stays with the author (MIT).

Podium Multi-Location Router

Overview

Route Podium API calls across multiple physical locations and operate the routing layer in production. This is not a tutorial on Podium's location model — it is the per-location dispatch code your integration runs when Sydney and Burleigh Heads share a single OAuth app, when an agency onboards five new stores in one afternoon, and when a compliance auditor walks in and asks "which location's webchat received that contact write at 14:07 UTC last Tuesday."

The six production failures this skill prevents:

1. Writes to wrong location silently — Sydney's contact write lands on Burleigh Heads' contact list because the calling code resolved location_uid from a stale lookup or hard-coded the wrong UID. The Podium API accepts it, returns 200, and the data sits in the wrong location with no error surface. Naive integrations discover this when a customer reports "I'm getting review requests for a store I've never been to."
2. Credential cross-contamination — Sydney's OAuth token gets reused for a write to Burleigh Heads. The Podium API does not reject this because the OAuth app is org-scoped and both locations live under the same org. The write succeeds; the audit trail attributes it to Sydney's credential; post-incident forensics cannot tell whether the write was authorized by Sydney's operator or by a bug.
3. Audit trail missing location-ID — log lines say wrote contact name=Jane Doe without saying which location_uid received the write. When a compliance question lands months later, the integration cannot answer "which location received this customer's data?" The answer determines GDPR data-subject scope and PCI cardholder-data exposure.
4. Bulk onboarding race condition — onboarding 5 new locations in one operation spawns 5 OAuth authorization flows. One fails partway (a user closed the consent tab, a redirect URI mismatched), the orchestrator continues with the rest, and the credentials map ends up with 4 valid entries + 1 dangling half-record. Subsequent operations against the half-onboarded location either crash or, worse, fall through to a default credential and write to the wrong place.
5. Location-ID verification skipped on write — the application code passes an arbitrary location_uid into the Podium call. Podium accepts any well-formed UID and returns 403 only if the current token genuinely has no access. The 403 is swallowed by an upstack handler ("just a stale auth, will retry"), and the integration silently stops working for one location while the rest keep flowing.
6. Rate-limits not isolated per location — the integration uses a single shared token bucket. Sydney runs a holiday review-request burst at 2pm and burns the org-wide quota; Burleigh Heads' webchats start returning 429 with no explanation visible to the Burleigh Heads operator who has done nothing wrong.

Prerequisites

• Python 3.10+
• podium-auth skill installed; this skill consumes its PodiumAuth and PodiumOrgRouter classes
• podium-rate-limit-survival skill installed; this skill consumes its per-bucket budget primitive
• Podium OAuth app with locations.read scope granted (verifying a location_uid requires GET /v4/locations)
• A writable directory for the audit log (default ./audit-log/podium-router.jsonl)
• A persistent location-credential map (file, AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, or SOPS-encrypted YAML)

Instructions

Build in this order. Each section neutralizes one production failure mode.

1. Per-location credential isolation (neutralizes cross-contamination)

The router holds one PodiumAuth instance per location_uid, never per org. Two locations under the same org get two separate auth instances because the audit trail must attribute every call to a specific location and a specific credential record — even if the underlying OAuth refresh token happens to be shared at the org level.

import asyncio, time
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Optional
from podium_auth import PodiumAuth, PodiumOrgRouter, PodiumAuthError

@dataclass
class LocationCredential:
    location_uid: str
    org_slug: str
    client_id: str
    client_secret: str
    refresh_token_file: str
    verified_at: float = 0.0   # unix seconds; 0 = never verified

class LocationRouter:
    def __init__(self, credentials: list[LocationCredential], audit_log_path: str):
        self._creds: dict[str, LocationCredential] = {c.location_uid: c for c in credentials}
        self._auths: dict[str, PodiumAuth] = {}
        self._audit_log_path = audit_log_path
        self._verify_lock = asyncio.Lock()

    def get_client(self, location_uid: str) -> "PodiumLocationClient":
        cred = self._creds.get(location_uid)
        if not cred:
            raise UnknownLocationError(location_uid)
        if location_uid not in self._auths:
            self._auths[location_uid] = PodiumAuth(
                client_id=cred.client_id,
                client_secret=cred.client_secret,
                refresh_token=load_refresh_token(cred.refresh_token_file),
            )
        return PodiumLocationClient(
            location_uid=location_uid,
            auth=self._auths[location_uid],
            router=self,
        )

The map key is location_uid, never org_slug. Two locations under the same org get two map entries with the same client_id/client_secret but distinct refresh_token_file paths. This is the line that prevents Sydney's token from being reused for a Burleigh Heads write — the router has no syntactic path from a location_uid to a different location's auth.

2. Pre-flight location-ID verification (neutralizes silent wrong-location writes)

Before any write, the router confirms the location_uid exists in the set returned by GET /v4/locations for the current credential. Cache the verification with a short TTL — typically 1 hour — so a re-org of locations on the Podium side eventually propagates without re-verifying every call.

VERIFY_TTL_SECONDS = 3600

async def ensure_location_verified(self, location_uid: str) -> None:
    cred = self._creds[location_uid]
    if time.time() - cred.verified_at < VERIFY_TTL_SECONDS:
        return
    async with self._verify_lock:
        if time.time() - cred.verified_at < VERIFY_TTL_SECONDS:
            return
        auth = self._auths[location_uid]
        token = await auth.get_token()
        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10) as c:
            r = await c.get(
                "https://api.podium.com/v4/locations",
                headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
            )
        if r.status_code != 200:
            raise LocationVerificationError(location_uid, r.status_code, r.text)
        ids = {loc["uid"] for loc in r.json().get("locations", [])}
        if location_uid not in ids:
            raise LocationNotInScopeError(location_uid, sorted(ids))
        cred.verified_at = time.time()

LocationNotInScopeError is the loud version of "Podium returned 403 silently." It fires before the call is made, so the caller cannot accidentally write to a location their token does not own. The 1-hour TTL keeps the verification cost negligible while bounding the staleness window.

3. Structured audit log on every call (neutralizes audit-trail gaps)

Every API call routed through this skill emits one JSON line to the audit log. The fields are fixed: {ts, location_uid, org_slug, endpoint, method, status, request_id, latency_ms}. No tokens, no request bodies, no PII — just the routing fingerprint.

import json, os, time, uuid

def emit_audit(self, *, location_uid: str, endpoint: str, method: str,
               status: int, latency_ms: float, request_id: str) -> None:
    cred = self._creds[location_uid]
    record = {
        "ts": time.time(),
        "location_uid": location_uid,
        "org_slug": cred.org_slug,
        "endpoint": endpoint,
        "method": method,
        "status": status,
        "request_id": request_id,
        "latency_ms": round(latency_ms, 2),
    }
    # Append-only; one line per call. Operators rotate with logrotate, not in-process.
    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(self._audit_log_path), exist_ok=True)
    with open(self._audit_log_path, "a") as f:
        f.write(json.dumps(record) + "\n")

The request_id is generated by the client wrapper (uuid.uuid4().hex) and also returned in any error so the operator can correlate a customer complaint to a single audit-log line. Six months later, when compliance asks "which location received this write?", audit_log_query.py answers in one second.

4. Idempotent bulk onboarding orchestrator (neutralizes partial-failure races)

Onboarding multiple locations in one operation must be resumable. The orchestrator processes one location at a time, writes each location's credential record to the map atomically, and is safe to re-run after partial failure — already-onboarded locations are detected and skipped.

@dataclass
class OnboardingResult:
    location_uid: str
    status: str          # "onboarded" | "skipped_existing" | "failed"
    error: Optional[str] = None

async def onboard_locations(self, new: list[LocationCredential]) -> list[OnboardingResult]:
    results: list[OnboardingResult] = []
    for cred in new:
        if cred.location_uid in self._creds:
            results.append(OnboardingResult(cred.location_uid, "skipped_existing"))
            continue
        try:
            # 1. Persist credential record atomically BEFORE adding to in-memory map
            self._persist_credential(cred)
            # 2. Build auth + verify location_uid is reachable
            self._auths[cred.location_uid] = PodiumAuth(
                client_id=cred.client_id,
                client_secret=cred.client_secret,
                refresh_token=load_refresh_token(cred.refresh_token_file),
            )
            self._creds[cred.location_uid] = cred
            await self.ensure_location_verified(cred.location_uid)
            results.append(OnboardingResult(cred.location_uid, "onboarded"))
        except Exception as e:
            # Roll back the half-written entry so a re-run doesn't see a phantom location
            self._creds.pop(cred.location_uid, None)
            self._auths.pop(cred.location_uid, None)
            results.append(OnboardingResult(cred.location_uid, "failed", str(e)))
    return results

The critical invariant: a location is either fully onboarded (credential persisted + auth instantiated + verification passed) or fully absent. There is no third state. A re-run after partial failure picks up exactly where the previous run left off.

5. Per-location rate-limit budgets (neutralizes shared-quota starvation)

This skill stacks on top of podium-rate-limit-survival. Each location gets its own token bucket; one location's burst cannot starve another. The default budget per location is conservative — read it from config/settings.yaml and tune per-deployment.

from podium_rate_limit import TokenBucket   # from podium-rate-limit-survival

class PodiumLocationClient:
    def __init__(self, location_uid: str, auth: PodiumAuth, router: LocationRouter):
        self._location_uid = location_uid
        self._auth = auth
        self._router = router
        # One bucket per location — sized to the per-location plan, NOT the org-wide quota.
        self._bucket = router.bucket_for(location_uid)

    async def call(self, method: str, path: str, **kwargs) -> httpx.Response:
        await self._router.ensure_location_verified(self._location_uid)
        await self._bucket.acquire()
        request_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
        token = await self._auth.get_token()
        start = time.monotonic()
        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10) as c:
            r = await c.request(
                method,
                f"https://api.podium.com{path}",
                headers={
                    "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
                    "X-Request-ID": request_id,
                },
                **kwargs,
            )
        self._router.emit_audit(
            location_uid=self._location_uid,
            endpoint=path,
            method=method,
            status=r.status_code,
            latency_ms=(time.monotonic() - start) * 1000,
            request_id=request_id,
        )
        return r

A burst from Sydney drains Sydney's bucket and only Sydney's bucket. Burleigh Heads has its own bucket with its own refill timer and remains operational regardless.

6. Unknown-location refusal (neutralizes silent fall-through)

Asking for a client for an unknown location_uid raises immediately. There is no default credential, no "best guess" routing, no fallback to the first registered location. This is the single line that prevents "5 fails, the 6th call falls through to wherever" from being a viable failure mode.

class UnknownLocationError(KeyError):
    def __init__(self, location_uid: str):
        super().__init__(
            f"No credentials for location_uid={location_uid}. "
            f"Run onboard_location.py to register, then reload the router."
        )

class LocationNotInScopeError(PodiumAuthError):
    def __init__(self, location_uid: str, scope: list[str]):
        super().__init__(
            403,
            f"location_uid={location_uid} not in /v4/locations scope. "
            f"Token sees {len(scope)} locations; this UID is not one of them. "
            f"Verify with verify_location.py."
        )

Error Handling

Examples

Pre-flight verify a location_uid before a write

python3 scripts/verify_location.py \
  --location-uid {your-location-uid} \
  --credentials-file ./config/locations.json

Exit code 0 = the UID is in scope; exit code 1 = not in scope (silent 403 prevented); exit code 2 = config or network error.

Onboard a new location idempotently

python3 scripts/onboard_location.py \
  --location-uid {your-new-location-uid} \
  --org-slug acme-rv-sydney \
  --client-id-env PODIUM_CLIENT_ID \
  --client-secret-env PODIUM_CLIENT_SECRET \
  --refresh-token-file ./secrets/sydney-refresh.json \
  --credentials-file ./config/locations.json

Re-running with the same --location-uid is safe — already-onboarded locations are detected and the script exits 0 with status skipped_existing.

Query the audit log for a specific location and date range

python3 scripts/audit_log_query.py \
  --audit-log ./audit-log/podium-router.jsonl \
  --location-uid {your-location-uid} \
  --since 2026-05-01 \
  --until 2026-05-12 \
  --output json

Output: one JSON record per matching call, including request_id for cross-correlation with downstream systems.

Programmatic use — write a contact to a specific location

router = LocationRouter.from_credentials_file("./config/locations.json",
                                              audit_log_path="./audit-log/podium-router.jsonl")
client = router.get_client(location_uid="{your-location-uid}")
r = await client.call("POST", "/v4/contacts", json={
    "first_name": "Jane",
    "last_name": "Doe",
    "phone": "+15555550100",
    "location_uid": "{your-location-uid}",
})
r.raise_for_status()

Every call produces exactly one audit-log line. The location_uid argument is verified against /v4/locations before the request is sent.

Output

• LocationRouter library with one PodiumAuth instance per location_uid (never per org)
• Pre-flight ensure_location_verified() against GET /v4/locations with a 1-hour TTL
• Append-only JSONL audit log: one line per call with {ts, location_uid, org_slug, endpoint, method, status, request_id, latency_ms}
• Idempotent onboard_locations() orchestrator — safe to re-run after partial failure
• Per-location token bucket sized independently of org-wide quota
• UnknownLocationError and LocationNotInScopeError to make silent wrong-location writes impossible

Resources

• Podium API docs — Locations
• Podium API docs — Contacts
• config/settings.yaml — verification TTL, audit-log path, per-location bucket defaults, onboarding concurrency
• references/errors.md — ERR_LOC_* codes with cause + solution
• references/examples.md — 10 worked examples (single-location, agency, onboarding, audit query)
• references/implementation.md — Node.js port, audit-log retention, SQLite query layer
• scripts/location_router.py — library: LocationRouter.get_client(location_uid)
• scripts/verify_location.py — CLI: confirm a location_uid is reachable
• scripts/onboard_location.py — CLI: idempotently onboard a new location
• scripts/audit_log_query.py — CLI: query the audit log by location_uid + date range