Imported from jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace (
skills/.curated/validating-csrf-protection/SKILL.md). Install upstream withnpx skills add jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace --skill validating-csrf-protection. Copyright stays with the author (MIT).
Validating CSRF Protection
Overview
Validate Cross-Site Request Forgery protection across web application endpoints, forms, and API routes. This skill examines synchronizer token patterns, double-submit cookie implementations, SameSite cookie attributes, Origin/Referer header validation, and custom header requirements to identify state-changing operations vulnerable to CSRF attacks.
Prerequisites
- Access to the target codebase and configuration files in
${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/ - Familiarity with the web framework in use (Express, Django, Rails, Spring, Laravel, etc.)
- Standard shell utilities and Grep/Glob available for codebase scanning
- Reference:
${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/README.mdfor CSRF protection methods, OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet, and framework-specific API examples
Instructions
- Inventory all state-changing endpoints by scanning for POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE route handlers using Grep. Include form action attributes in HTML templates, AJAX calls in JavaScript, and API route definitions.
- For each state-changing endpoint, verify that at least one CSRF protection mechanism is in place: synchronizer token, double-submit cookie, SameSite cookie attribute, Origin validation, or custom header requirement.
- Validate synchronizer token implementation: confirm tokens are generated server-side using a CSPRNG, bound to the user session, included in forms as hidden fields or request headers, and validated on every state-changing request. Flag tokens that are static, predictable, or reused across sessions as CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery).
- Check double-submit cookie patterns: verify the cookie value matches the request body or header value, the cookie uses
SecureandHttpOnlyattributes, and the comparison is timing-safe to prevent token extraction. - Assess SameSite cookie attributes on session cookies: verify
SameSite=StrictorSameSite=Laxis set. FlagSameSite=NonewithoutSecureas severity high. Note thatSameSite=Laxpermits top-level GET navigations, which may be insufficient for GET endpoints that trigger state changes. - Verify Origin/Referer header validation: check that the server validates the
Originheader against an allowlist on state-changing requests. Flag implementations that fall back to no protection when the header is absent. - For API endpoints using token-based auth (JWT in Authorization header), confirm that cookies are not also sent -- if cookies are used alongside bearer tokens, CSRF protection remains necessary.
- Check for CSRF bypass vectors: look for state-changing GET endpoints, JSONP endpoints, content-type sniffing (missing
Content-Typeenforcement), and Flash/Silverlight crossdomain.xml files. - Classify each finding by severity (critical for unprotected financial/admin endpoints, high for other state-changing endpoints, medium for defense-in-depth gaps).
- Generate remediation guidance with framework-specific CSRF middleware configuration examples.
Output
- Endpoint inventory: Table of all state-changing endpoints with their CSRF protection status (Protected, Partially Protected, Unprotected)
- Findings report: Each finding includes severity, CWE-352 reference, affected endpoint/file, attack scenario description, and remediation code
- Protection coverage: Percentage of state-changing endpoints with validated CSRF protection
- SameSite cookie audit: Table of all session/auth cookies with their SameSite, Secure, HttpOnly, and Path attributes
- Remediation guide: Framework-specific middleware setup (e.g.,
csurffor Express,@csrf_protectfor Django,csrf_meta_tagsfor Rails)
Error Handling
| Error | Cause | Solution |
|---|---|---|
| No state-changing endpoints found | Unconventional routing patterns or SPA architecture | Check for client-side routing frameworks (React Router, Vue Router) and trace API calls from frontend code |
| CSRF middleware detected but not applied globally | Middleware applied per-route rather than globally | Verify every state-changing route has the middleware applied; flag gaps in coverage |
| Token generation source unclear | Framework abstracts CSRF token generation | Check framework documentation for default CSPRNG usage; inspect framework source if needed |
| SameSite attribute not set in code | Cookie attributes set at infrastructure layer | Check reverse proxy, load balancer, or CDN cookie rewriting rules |
| Mixed protection strategies | Different endpoints use different CSRF mechanisms | Document each strategy and verify consistency; recommend standardizing on one approach |
Examples
Express.js CSRF Token Validation
Scan ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/src/routes/ for router.post and router.put handlers. Verify
each includes csurf middleware or equivalent token validation. Flag any POST
handler that directly processes req.body without csrfProtection middleware
as CWE-352, severity critical for financial operations, high for other state changes.
Django CSRF Middleware Audit
Grep ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/settings.py for django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware in
the MIDDLEWARE list. Scan views for @csrf_exempt decorators -- flag each
exempted view as a potential CSRF vulnerability requiring justification. Verify
templates include {% csrf_token %} in all form tags.
SPA + API CSRF Assessment
For a React frontend calling a REST API, verify that the API enforces a custom
header requirement (e.g., X-Requested-With) or uses double-submit cookies.
Check that the SPA reads the CSRF token from a cookie and includes it in the
X-CSRF-Token header. Flag API endpoints that accept application/x-www-form-urlencoded
without CSRF validation as severity high (exploitable via HTML forms).