Imported from mindicator/invAIriant (skill/SKILL.md). Install upstream with npx skills add mindicator/invAIriant --skill skill. Copyright stays with the author.

invAIriant — evidence-based multi-lens architecture audit

This skill is the primary product: the audit discipline itself, run by an LLM coding agent. The schemas, templates, and prompt pack are the layer it stands on; the invairiant CLI is only infrastructure around it (validate, collect evidence, render, gate) and never performs the audit.

The protocol's non-negotiable rules — enforce them at every step and repeat them to every sub-agent you spawn:

No evidence, no finding.
Do not average away critical risks.
Separate observation from verified finding.
Do not produce confident claims from vibes.

The audit target

Every invAIriant audit resolves to one audit target:

audit target = pinned scope + evidence bundle + selected lenses + report type

PR is the main entrypoint; the other scope-selecting commands below differ only in the first term — how the scope is pinned. The bundle shape, the four-stage pipeline, the evidence discipline, and the report structure are identical across all of them. invAIriant audits bounded engineering scopes, not vibes; it does not perform open-ended repository search or brainstorming.

collect fails closed: any scope it cannot bound — a missing range, an unknown path/sha, an ADR with no resolvable references or one resolving too broadly — exits non-zero rather than silently widening to the whole repo. repo is the one deliberately unbounded scope. Every bundle carries a resolved_scope block naming the boundary, so what was and was not audited is explicit. The scope kind is orthogonal to the audit type in methodology.md §4 — a range can drive a tactical audit, an ADR an event-triggered one.

pr is an optional resolver adapter. The core scopes are pure-local git; only --scope pr may reach the remote — it pins a PR by number, via gh if present, else the pull/<n>/head ref, then turns the PR into an ordinary bounded base...head range (recorded in resolved_scope as base / head / resolver). If the PR can't be reached (no remote, offline, not a GitHub remote) it fails closed and suggests --range — it does not fall back to scanning the repo. For content-level signals (grep pointers), check out the PR first (gh pr checkout <N>, or run in CI where the PR head is the checkout); the diff, file set, and mass are correct from git either way.

Commands

Parse the first token of the invocation as the command. Default (no token) → full-audit for a repo, audit-pr when a diff/PR is in scope.

--lenses a,b overrides lens selection (comma-separated lens ids from docs/lens-taxonomy.md); omit it to let the skill pick by risk surface.

The four stages and their prompts:

[1] lens pass          prompts/lens-auditor.md        (one lens per pass)
[2] evidence verify    prompts/evidence-verifier.md   (adversarial: refute)
[3] severity classify  prompts/severity-classifier.md (rules, not averages)
[4] synthesize         prompts/report-synthesizer.md  (rejected items kept)

Stage boundaries are load-bearing: stage 1 never assigns final severity; stage 2 never invents findings; stage 3 touches only verified findings; stage 4 never drops a rejected hypothesis.

A lens pass is a discovery pass, not a scoring-only pass: each lens actively searches the bounded target for candidate architectural findings. Candidate findings become final findings only after adversarial evidence verification (stage 2). The score is a byproduct of what the search turns up — not the goal.

Try it (copy-paste)

/invairiant audit-pr                              # audit the current diff/PR
/invairiant audit-pr 123                          # a PR by number (gh / pull-ref)
/invairiant audit-pr --lenses security-threat,turing
/invairiant audit-pr HEAD~1..HEAD                 # a specific range
/invairiant audit-range origin/main..HEAD         # drift across a range
/invairiant audit-commit 9f3c1ac                  # one commit
/invairiant audit-module cli/                      # a module subtree
/invairiant audit-adr docs/adr/0012.md            # ADR ↔ code drift
/invairiant audit-rp docs/proposals/refactor.md   # would this refactor break invariants?
/invairiant full-audit                            # whole repo, mandatory lenses
/invairiant verify-findings <candidate findings>  # stage 2 only
/invairiant closure-verification                  # after a fix wave

What audit-pr gives you: a ready-to-paste PR comment (templates/pr-comment.md) — verdict (pass / pass_with_conditions / fail), the audited range, the checklist, verified findings each with cited evidence, conditions, and observations/hypotheses kept separate. Nothing is merged or approved — you own the gate.

Step 0 — locate the framework

Find the framework root (dir containing lenses/, prompts/, schemas/, templates/, docs/, cli/): $INVAIRIANT_HOME, then this skill's parent, then ./invairiant/ or ./docs/invairiant/, then ~/.invairiant/. If not found, run degraded mode (below) rather than inventing lens content.

Shared setup (all audit commands)

1. Config. Read invairiant.config.yml. If absent, offer invairiant init --type <inferred> (or write one after confirming project type, canonical docs, risk assets, and 4–6 mandatory lenses via docs/lens-taxonomy.md). Validate it: invairiant validate-config.
2. Scope. Pin the audit target (the scope kind + its pin — see The audit target). collect resolves it to a bounded file set and fails closed if it cannot; state what is in and out of scope.
3. Lens selection. Mandatory lenses from config, plus at most the packs the change/risk surface justifies. Anti-overengineering is canon: a small PR gets the checklist + ≤2 lenses; default full audits use 4–6, not 20.
4. Evidence gathering. Run invairiant collect --scope <kind> [target] --out .invairiant/cache/bundle.json — the scope matches the command (see The audit target) — to build the deterministic evidence bundle (diff/snapshot, tree, language stats, grep signals, import hints, generated mass, known-rejected), all computed over the resolved scope only. Hand it to the lens passes as input. Everything in it is a candidate pointer, never a finding — it still passes stage 2. Read the bundle's resolved_scope and audit only inside it; do not wander outside the boundary. The raw bundle stays gitignored. Its known_rejected lists hypotheses ruled out in past audits (from committed memory) — do not re-propose them without new evidence.

Command procedures

audit-pr [<pr#|range>] [--lenses a,b]

Scope = the diff + its blast radius. Runbook:

1. Shared setup (config, scope, lens selection). Lenses: --lenses if given, else ≤2 chosen by the diff's risk surface (new agent loop → turing/oracle-boundary; new endpoint → security-threat; migration → kleppmann/mcconnell; big generated diff → generated-surface-area).
2. Collect the bundle — pin the PR by number: invairiant collect --scope pr --pr <N> --out .invairiant/cache/bundle.json (resolves the PR to its base...head range via gh/pull-ref, fails closed if unreachable). For a local diff with no PR number, use --scope range --range <base>...<head> or the working tree. Feed the bundle to the lens passes as input.
3. Pipeline stages 1 (lens passes) → 2 (verify) → 3 (classify) → 4 (synthesize), against the PR checklist in templates/pr-comment.md.
4. Deliverable: a PR comment — synthesize the report, then render it with invairiant render-comment <report.json> (the templates/pr-comment.md shape): verdict (pass / pass_with_conditions / fail), verified findings with cited evidence, conditions, observations/hypotheses kept separate. Paste it into the PR (the CLI does not post).

Do not merge/approve anything — present the gate.

audit-range · audit-commit · audit-module · audit-adr · audit-rp

Same runbook as audit-pr — shared setup, collect, pipeline 1→2→3→4, deliverable — differing only in how scope is pinned at collect time and the natural report type. Do not re-derive the pipeline; reuse it.

1. Collect with the matching scope (see The audit target):

   • audit-range <A..B> → collect --scope range --range <A..B>
   • audit-commit <sha> → collect --scope commit --commit <sha>
   • audit-module <path> → collect --scope module --path <path>
   • audit-adr <adr.md> → collect --scope adr --path <adr.md> [--narrow <p>]
   • audit-rp <rp.md> → collect --scope rp --path <rp.md> [--narrow <p>]

   If collect exits non-zero (scope could not be bounded), stop and report that — narrow the scope (--narrow, a tighter path, an explicit range). Never fall back to auditing the whole repo; that is full-audit, chosen deliberately.

2. Audit only inside resolved_scope. The bundle's tree, signals, and mass are already restricted to the resolved file set — treat that set as the world for this audit.

3. Lens selection by the resolved surface: a range/commit → the diff's risk surface (as audit-pr); a module → the ≤4 lenses its responsibility invites; an ADR → the lenses the decision is about (a transport ADR → security-threat + the relevant systems lens), plus the doc/code-drift check — the ADR text rides along in the bundle as a canonical doc, so contradictions between the decision and the code are first-class evidence. An RP is the mirror image of an ADR: the proposal describes an intended change and the bundle snapshots the code as it is now, so the question is forward-looking — would applying this proposal break an invariant the code currently holds? Pick the lenses that own those invariants (parnas/boundaries, liskov/contracts, security-threat/surface, plus any the proposal names), and treat "the RP claims X, the code relies on ¬X" as a candidate finding.

4. Pipeline 1→2→3→4, then the deliverable: for a range/commit/module, invairiant render-report (or render-comment for a review-style handoff); for an ADR, a doc-drift report whose findings cite ADR §↔code contradictions; for an RP, an invariant-risk report — each finding an invariant the proposal would break, with the current code that holds it as evidence and a preserve-it condition.

full-audit

Scope = whole system at a pinned commit. Assign roles (docs/methodology.md §5). Run one stage-1 pass per selected lens using each lens file's Prompt Block (sub-agents may run passes in parallel; a human or a second agent spot-checks). Then stages 2→4. Fill templates/audit-report.md: lens-score table, findings by severity, observations, Unsupported Hypotheses (kept), strongest/weakest lens, required actions with owners, evidence appendix. Every audit produces decisions; an audit without decisions does not count. Validate the result: invairiant validate-report. File it in the config's report dir, then record it to audit memory: invairiant record <report.json> appends the distilled, sanitized findings / rejected hypotheses / lens scores to .invairiant/history/ (committed). Use invairiant history to see lens-score trends and recurring findings.

verify-findings

Input: candidate findings (JSON per schemas/finding.schema.json, or prose). Apply prompts/evidence-verifier.md with repo access: open cited lines, re-run commands, search for "missing" tests before agreeing, read both sides of contradictions. Emit each as verified / rejected (with reason) / demoted to observation. Invent nothing; drop nothing.

classify-severity

Input: verified findings. Apply prompts/severity-classifier.md with the config's severity_policy, risk_assets, named categories, and docs/severity-model.md: named-category defaults, score→severity floors, confidence constraints (S0/S1 require high/medium), one-line justification per severity. Never lower a severity because the average is good.

synthesize-report

Input: scored findings + observations/hypotheses + metadata. Apply prompts/report-synthesizer.md to fill the report template. Verdict derives from open findings (any S0 → fail; any S1 → at best pass_with_conditions), never from score averages. Optionally render with invairiant render-report.

closure-verification

After a wave of fixes or incident fix-forwards, verify closure without a full re-audit (docs/audit-workflow.md §5). For each finding claimed closed: confirm the fix landed with conformance evidence; check no new boundary drift or hidden channels appeared; CI green at the verified HEAD; canonical docs synced; temporary workarounds removed. Output a short closure report — each claim → verified / not-verified, plus remaining open findings with owners. It re-verifies claims; it does not search for new findings.

The CLI is a seatbelt, not an auditor

Use the invairiant CLI for deterministic infrastructure only — never for judgment (docs/cli.md):

• invairiant init — scaffold a config;
• invairiant collect — gather the deterministic evidence bundle (candidate pointers only);
• invairiant validate-config / validate-report — schema-check inputs/outputs;
• invairiant render-report — deterministic JSON→Markdown;
• invairiant render-comment — deterministic report→PR-comment;
• invairiant ci-gate — exit non-zero on open S0/S1;
• invairiant record / history — append/read committed sanitized audit memory (rejected hypotheses, finding registry, lens-score trends).

The CLI never runs a lens, produces a finding, or assigns a score. All architectural judgment lives here, in the agent, under these prompts.

Humans own the gates

Never merge, approve, close, or release on the basis of an audit. Present the verdict and the gate implication, then stop. Applying fixes is separate work after the audit; keep the report as the record of what was found.

Degraded mode (framework files unavailable)

State that the full lens library is not installed, then audit with four generic lenses — parnas, mcconnell, security-threat, turing — scoring each 0–10, applying the same evidence rules, severity floors (S0 blocks; S1 before next major step; S2 next cycle), and report structure, keeping observations separate from findings.

Refuse these failure modes

• A finding without concrete evidence — demote it, whoever proposed it.
• "The average is high, so the S1 is fine" — never.
• Deleting a rejected hypothesis — it goes to Unsupported Hypotheses.
• Running 15 lenses on a 40-line PR — the protocol forbids tribunals.
• Letting a scanner or reviewer-skill's output become a finding without stage-2 verification — adapters produce candidate evidence only.
• Using the CLI to "audit" — it has no judgment; it only serves the audit.