Imported from VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic (skills/frontend/angular-template-sanitizer-security-review/SKILL.md). Install upstream with npx skills add VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic --skill angular-template-sanitizer-security-review. Copyright stays with the author.

Angular Template Sanitizer Security Review

Purpose

Review Angular templates, components, and their data-flow for the documented injection classes Angular's own sanitizer architecture is built to catch, and that are only unsafe when application code deliberately or accidentally routes around it: DomSanitizer bypass calls (bypassSecurityTrustHtml, bypassSecurityTrustUrl, bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl) fed by user-reachable input, unsanitized [innerHTML] bindings, and dynamically bound iframe security attributes such as [attr.sandbox] that Angular's own NG0910 check exists to reject. This skill exists so the review stays anchored to these documented, concrete sinks instead of drifting into a general "Angular code review" — it does not re-litigate change detection, signals architecture, or component design in every response.

When to use

Use this skill when the user asks to:

• review whether a bypassSecurityTrustHtml, bypassSecurityTrustUrl, or bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl call is safe,
• assess whether an [innerHTML] binding is safe,
• review an <iframe> embed for a dynamically bound security attribute ([attr.sandbox], [sandbox], [attr.allow], [attr.credentialless]) or an NG0910 error,
• perform a pre-launch security review of Angular templates that render user- or third-party-supplied content.

Do not use this skill for:

• Angular architecture review with no security angle (signals usage, change-detection strategy, component decomposition quality) — use angular-architecture-signals-review instead,
• SSR/hydration-specific defects (TransferState leakage, hydration mismatches) — use angular-ssr-hydration-review instead,
• a bug that requires live traffic reproduction (a captured XSS payload in a running app, a browser-based exploit proof) to confirm exploitation — static analysis proves the structural risk, not that it has already been exploited in production.

Context7 Documentation Protocol

• Resolve the Angular library ID with resolve-library-id (matched result: /angular/angular) before citing any sanitizer-mechanism or NG0910 claim.
• /angular/angular is Angular's own source-and-docs repository (high reputation, corroborated against packages/platform-browser/src/security/dom_sanitization_service.ts, packages/core/src/sanitization/html_sanitizer.ts, packages/core/src/render3/instructions/shared.ts, and adev/src/content/reference/errors/NG0910.md). Use query-docs against it to confirm low-level sanitizer mechanics directly from source: that bypassSecurityTrustHtml (and its URL/resource-URL siblings) mark a value trusted so sanitize() skips the HTML/URL sanitizer and returns the value unchanged, that property bindings like [innerHTML] accept a compiler-added sanitizer function that only risky properties receive, and that text interpolation instead calls renderer.setValue() on a text node — a path that never parses HTML and needs no sanitizer.
• Before flagging a [attr.sandbox]/[sandbox]/[attr.allow]/[attr.credentialless] binding, confirm Angular's own NG0910 check: these attributes are documented as required to be static (fixed at element-creation time) because they configure the iframe's security model before src/srcdoc load — a dynamic binding either throws NG0910 in dev or, if that check is suppressed, lets a runtime value weaken the sandbox.
• Read the component's imports first to confirm DomSanitizer (from @angular/platform-browser) is actually in use before assuming a bypass call exists — do not assume a project uses the bypass APIs without confirming the import and call site.
• If Context7 is unavailable, fall back to the official_docs URLs in this skill's metadata.json and label the claim documentation-based, unverified against current release.

Lean operating rules

• Injection findings default to HIGH severity. This is a security-scoped skill: do not downgrade an untraced bypassSecurityTrustHtml/bypassSecurityTrustUrl/bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl call or an unsanitized [innerHTML] binding to MEDIUM just because it has not been observed exploited yet — the risk is in the structure, not in whether someone has already hit it.
• Trace every finding to a concrete file:line and a concrete data-flow path. A finding that says "this bypass call might be unsafe" or "this innerHTML might be risky" without showing the specific origin (route param, query string, request body, or a third-party API response that itself echoes user input) and the specific sink is not a valid finding — it is a guess.
• Do not approve any bypassSecurityTrustHtml, bypassSecurityTrustUrl, or bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl call whose input includes user-reachable data unless the trace shows the value was validated or sanitized on that exact path before the bypass call — the bypass APIs are intentional escape hatches from Angular's compiler-driven sanitization, not accidental gaps, so their mere presence is not evidence of prior review.
• Do not approve an [innerHTML] binding fed by user-reachable input unless a named sanitizer call (e.g., DomSanitizer.sanitize(SecurityContext.HTML, ...), or a project-specific equivalent) is visibly present on that exact data-flow path. A sanitizer import existing elsewhere in the codebase does not clear this bar — trace the specific path under review.
• Flag any [attr.sandbox], [sandbox], [attr.allow], or [attr.credentialless] binding on an <iframe> as a finding regardless of whether NG0910 is currently thrown in the reviewed environment — a suppressed or bypassed dev-mode check does not make the underlying dynamic-security-attribute pattern safe in production.
• Check dynamic [href]/[src] bindings fed through bypassSecurityTrustUrl/bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl for scheme validation (an allowlist rejecting javascript: and other non-http(s) schemes) on the traced path before the bypass call — the bypass call itself performs no validation.
• Never execute, build, or run application code, and never send live requests, as part of this review; this is a static-review skill (Read/Grep/Glob only).
• Load only the reference needed for the concern in scope.

References

Load these only when needed:

• Review workflow and findings contract — use for the step-by-step review procedure, the sanitizer-bypass/innerHTML/iframe decision tree, and the required output shape.
• DomSanitizer bypass calls and innerHTML — load only when the review scope includes a bypassSecurityTrustHtml/bypassSecurityTrustUrl/bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl call or an [innerHTML] binding. Includes the OWASP XSS grounding reference; load that citation only when a finding is actually present.
• Dynamic iframe security attributes — load only when the review scope includes an <iframe> element with a bound sandbox, allow, or credentialless attribute, or a reported NG0910 error.

Response minimum

Return, at minimum:

• the component(s), template binding(s), and/or DomSanitizer call site(s) in scope,
• ranked findings with file:line evidence, defect category (xss, url-injection, or iframe-sandbox-escape), the concrete data-flow trace (origin-to-sink path naming every hop), and a fix sketch matching Angular's documented pattern,
• for every bypass call or [innerHTML] finding, an explicit statement of whether validation or sanitization is present on the traced path — never approve on the assumption one exists elsewhere,
• evidence level per finding (repo evidence, documentation-based, or inference), with structural risk findings explicitly labeled as structural risk, not as confirmed-exploited,
• verdict (approve / approve-with-notes / block),
• open questions or scope the review could not cover (e.g., "confirming actual exploitation requires a live payload test in a running browser session, not static review").