meme-coin-audit

Imported from themodernhacker/bugbounty-toolkit (skills/claude-bughunter/meme-coin-audit/SKILL.md). Install upstream with npx skills add themodernhacker/bugbounty-toolkit --skill meme-coin-audit. Copyright stays with the author.

MEME COIN & TOKEN SECURITY AUDIT

Fast-kill rug pull detection and deep token security analysis for EVM and Solana meme coins.

PRE-DIVE KILL SIGNALS

Check these BEFORE reading a single line of code. If any are true, skip the audit — the token is likely a rug or not worth the time.

Hard Kills (Skip Immediately)

• Contract not verified on Etherscan/Solscan → Cannot audit source = cannot trust
• Deployer wallet has history of rug pulls (check Etherscan deployer page)
• Token age < 1 hour AND no known team → Too early, wait for more data
• Mint authority retained (Solana) AND no cap → Infinite mint = certain rug
• Freeze authority retained (Solana) on meme coin → Honeypot confirmed
• Transfer hook present (Token-2022) with mutable hook program → Honeypot vector
• Permanent delegate extension (Token-2022) → Can steal all holder tokens

Soft Kills (Proceed with Extreme Caution)

• Top holder > 20% of supply (excluding DEX pools)
• LP not burned or locked in verified contract
• Contract is upgradeable / proxy with retained admin
• Less than $5K liquidity in the pool
• No social presence / anonymous deployer with no history

THE ONE RULE

"Check ALL authorities and owner functions. The retained authority IS the rug vector."

Every rug pull requires a privileged operation: mint, blacklist, fee change, LP removal, or authority abuse. If you find the privilege, you found the bug.

BUG CLASSES (8 TOKEN-SPECIFIC)

1. HIDDEN MINT / UNLIMITED SUPPLY

Common rug pattern. Deployer mints tokens post-launch, dumps on LP.

Quick grep (EVM):

grep -rn "function mint\|_mint(\|_balances\[.*\] +=" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "test\|lib\|node_modules"

Quick grep (Solana):

grep -rn "MintTo\|mint_to\|mint_authority" src/ --include="*.rs" | grep -v "test\|target"

Kill if: MAX_SUPPLY enforced in every mint path, or mint function removed entirely.

2. HONEYPOT / TRANSFER RESTRICTION

Common scam pattern. Buy works, sell blocked.

Quick grep:

grep -rn "blacklist\|isBlacklisted\|_bots\|maxTxAmount\|approve.*override\|tradingEnabled" src/ --include="*.sol"

Solana equivalent:

grep -rn "freeze_authority\|transfer_hook\|TransferHook\|permanent_delegate" src/ --include="*.rs"

Kill if: No blacklist mapping, no transfer hooks, no freeze authority.

3. FEE MANIPULATION

Common rug pattern. Sell fee set to 99% after initial buys.

Quick grep:

grep -rn "setFee\|setSellFee\|_taxFee\|_sellFee" src/ --include="*.sol"
grep -rn "function set.*Fee" -A5 src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "require\|MAX\|<="

Kill if: Fee setter has require(fee <= MAX_FEE) with MAX_FEE <= 10%.

4. LIQUIDITY POOL DRAIN

LP removal, migration, or manipulation to crash price.

Quick grep:

grep -rn "migrateLP\|emergencyWithdraw\|\.sync()\|setPair\|setRouter" src/ --include="*.sol"

Kill if: LP tokens burned to dead address, no migration function, no pair setter.

5. BONDING CURVE MANIPULATION

Exploits in pump.fun-style bonding curves.

Quick grep:

grep -rn "virtualReserve\|setCurve\|graduate\|bonding_curve" src/ --include="*.sol" --include="*.rs"

Kill if: Curve parameters immutable, graduation permissionless.

6. AUTHORITY RETENTION (SOLANA)

Retained mint/freeze/update authorities on Solana tokens.

Quick grep:

grep -rn "mint_authority\|freeze_authority\|update_authority\|close_authority" src/ --include="*.rs"
grep -rn "set_authority.*None" src/ --include="*.rs"  # Good sign: revocation

Kill if: All authorities = None, verified on-chain.

7. FAKE RENOUNCE / HIDDEN OWNERSHIP

Ownership appears renounced but backdoor control retained.

Quick grep:

grep -rn "renounceOwnership.*override\|_shadowAdmin\|_backupOwner\|selfdestruct" src/ --include="*.sol"

Kill if: renounceOwnership NOT overridden, no second admin role, no selfdestruct.

8. SANDWICH AMPLIFICATION BY DESIGN

Contract makes holders maximally sandwichable.

Quick grep:

grep -rn "swapExactTokensForETH" -A5 src/ --include="*.sol" | grep "0,"
grep -rn "swapThreshold\|_rebase\|mandatoryPool" src/ --include="*.sol"

Kill if: Auto-swap has proper slippage, no rebase mechanics.

FAST RED-FLAG SWEEP

Run the 8 bug-class greps above across the source tree for fast red-flag detection. Together they catch:

• Direct mint/balance manipulation
• Blacklist and transfer restriction patterns
• Unbounded fee setters
• LP migration and emergency withdraw functions
• Fake renounce overrides
• Zero slippage auto-swaps
• All Solana authority patterns
• Token-2022 dangerous extensions

Source grep does NOT check (verify these out-of-band):

• On-chain state (use Etherscan/Solscan for authority verification)
• Holder distribution (use DEXTools/Birdeye)
• LP lock status (use Unicrypt/PinkLock/Solscan)
• Deployer wallet history (manual check)

FOUNDRY POC TEMPLATE (TOKEN EXPLOITS)

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "../src/Token.sol";

contract TokenExploitTest is Test {
    Token token;
    address owner = makeAddr("owner");
    address victim = makeAddr("victim");
    address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");

    // Uniswap V2 router (mainnet fork)
    address constant ROUTER = 0x7a250d5630B4cF539739dF2C5dAcb4c659F2488D;
    address constant WETH = 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2;

    function setUp() public {
        vm.createSelectFork("mainnet");
        // Deploy token as owner
        vm.startPrank(owner);
        token = new Token();
        // Add liquidity...
        vm.stopPrank();
    }

    function test_hiddenMint_rug() public {
        // Step 1: Victim buys tokens
        vm.startPrank(victim);
        // ... buy tokens on Uniswap
        vm.stopPrank();

        // Step 2: Owner mints and dumps
        vm.startPrank(owner);
        uint256 supplyBefore = token.totalSupply();
        token.mint(owner, 1_000_000_000e18);
        assertGt(token.totalSupply(), supplyBefore, "Supply should increase");
        // ... sell minted tokens
        vm.stopPrank();

        // Step 3: Victim's tokens are now worthless
        // Assert token price crashed
    }

    function test_honeypot_blacklist() public {
        // Step 1: Victim buys
        vm.startPrank(victim);
        // ... buy tokens
        vm.stopPrank();

        // Step 2: Owner blacklists victim
        vm.startPrank(owner);
        token.blacklist(victim);
        vm.stopPrank();

        // Step 3: Victim cannot sell
        vm.startPrank(victim);
        vm.expectRevert("Blacklisted");
        token.transfer(address(1), 100e18);
        vm.stopPrank();
    }

    function test_fee_manipulation_rug() public {
        // Step 1: Verify initial fee is low
        assertEq(token.sellFee(), 3); // 3%

        // Step 2: Owner sets fee to 99%
        vm.prank(owner);
        token.setFees(3, 99); // Buy 3%, Sell 99%

        // Step 3: Victim sells — loses 99% to fees
        vm.startPrank(victim);
        uint256 balanceBefore = address(victim).balance;
        // ... sell tokens
        // Assert: received almost nothing
        vm.stopPrank();
    }
}

SOLANA QUICK CHECKS (NO SOURCE CODE NEEDED)

When you don't have source code, check on-chain:

1. MINT AUTHORITY → solana account <MINT> --output json | check mint_authority
   - Should be null
   - If Some(pubkey) → CRITICAL: can mint infinite tokens

2. FREEZE AUTHORITY → same as above, check freeze_authority
   - Should be null
   - If Some(pubkey) → CRITICAL: honeypot

3. LP STATUS → Check Raydium/Orca pool
   - LP burned? (tokens sent to 1111...1111)
   - LP locked? (in verified locker with no backdoor)
   - LP held by deployer? → CRITICAL: instant rug

4. TOP HOLDERS → Birdeye/Solscan holders tab
   - Top 10 < 30% of supply (excluding pools)
   - Creator wallets (check first transactions)

5. PROGRAM UPGRADEABILITY
   - Is the program upgradeable? → can change any logic
   - Upgrade authority should be None for immutable programs

6. TOKEN-2022 EXTENSIONS
   - Any transfer hook? → potential honeypot
   - Permanent delegate? → CRITICAL

Related Skills & Chains

• web3-audit — When the target is a DeFi protocol (not just a token). Workflow primitive: this skill's 8 token-specific bug classes are a subset of web3-audit's scope; if the target has lending / vault / oracle logic beyond the token contract itself, also load web3-audit for the broader 10 DeFi bug classes.
• triage-validation — When deciding if a rug-pull finding qualifies as a bug bounty submission. Workflow primitive: many "rug vector" observations are pre-rug warnings, not exploitable bugs in a deployed protocol; run 7Q gate to distinguish "the deployer COULD rug" (informational) from "the contract IS exploitable now" (reportable).
• report-writing — When writing up a confirmed token security finding for Immunefi / private bounty. Workflow primitive: Foundry PoC template here feeds into report-writing's Immunefi body template.
• offensive-osint — When the token has off-chain infrastructure (project website, Telegram, deployer doxxing). Workflow primitive: on-chain audit is this skill's domain; deployer wallet history, social presence, and project legitimacy checks route to offensive-osint.
• bb-methodology — When confirming engagement mode. Workflow primitive: PART 0 separates "pre-investment due diligence" (this skill's primary use) from "Immunefi bug bounty submission" (different reporting + severity standards); the answer routes which post-audit handoff is correct.

Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)

Engagement-derived + 2026-specific additions to the vendored foundation. Wisdom from real authorized engagements + Phase 2 verification across this repo's 31+ skill-area live tests. The upstream content covers the WHAT; this layer covers the WHEN-IT-WORKS-vs-WHEN-IT-DOESN'T.

Solana-specific signals — 2025-2026 reality

Token-2022 transfer hooks are the new rug-pull vector. Hook authority can be set to a single key; that key can pause / blacklist / fee-on-transfer arbitrary addresses post-launch. Always check hook authority + permanent-delegate authority for Token-2022 mints:

# get mint extensions for a Token-2022 mint
spl-token display <MINT_ADDRESS> --program-id TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb
# look for: TransferHook { authority: ... }, PermanentDelegate { delegate: ... }

If TransferHook authority is non-null → the holder of that key can revoke transfer rights mid-trade. If PermanentDelegate is non-null → that delegate can move any holder's tokens at any time (effectively a built-in confiscation). Either alone is rug-class.

pump.fun bonding curves can be manipulated via the curve's K-parameter; mint authority retained beyond bonding-curve completion is the classic exit-scam shape. Check mintAuthority AFTER the curve completes — legitimate launches null it, scams retain it for the post-graduation dump.

Honeypot detection — beyond the obvious

transfer() succeeds in dry-run but fails on certain addresses (sender allowlist / blocklist). Test with: simulated buy → simulated transfer to a different address → simulated sell. If buy + transfer succeed but sell fails, it's a honeypot.

Quick triage matrix:

Cross-source verification: solana-rugcheck, rugcheck.xyz, dexscreener risk signals, honeypot.is (EVM). Never trust a single source — rug-checkers can be fooled by deferred-malice patterns (clean for first 7 days, hook activates later).

LP lock claims — verify, don't trust

LP-lock badges on DexScreener mean nothing without on-chain verification. Check the actual lock contract (Unicrypt, TeamFinance, Bonkbot, PinkLock) for:

• Unlock date — the on-chain timestamp, not the badge text
• Lock owner — is it the deployer's wallet? Are there multiple lockers fragmenting the LP?
• Extension / shortening permission — some lock contracts allow the owner to SHORTEN the lock; that's an exit hatch dressed as a lock
• Lock contract bytecode — verify it's the canonical locker, not a fork with backdoors

Some "locked" LPs are 1-day locks renewed weekly — visually the same as a year lock to the buyer, but the deployer can let it lapse on any Tuesday. Always read the lock contract source on the chain explorer.

Pre-investment due diligence in under 5 minutes

The 6-question fast filter:

1. Mint authority null?
2. Freeze authority null?
3. Update authority null (for metadata immutability)?
4. LP locked in a verified contract for > 6 months?
5. Top 10 holders concentration < 30% (excluding pools/burn addresses)?
6. Bonding curve completed (for pump.fun) AND post-completion mint authority null?

Five "no"s = walk away. Three "no"s = high risk, only enter with size you'd walk away from. Two "no"s with strong narrative + thin liquidity = the canonical retail trap.

MEV / sandwich amplification on illiquid mints

Buying into a mint with < $50K liquidity guarantees you'll be sandwiched. The bot infrastructure on Solana and Ethereum is institutionalized in 2026 — Jito MEV-share and private order-flow auctions. If your trade size > 1% of available liquidity, expect sandwich loss > 5%; > 5% of liquidity, expect > 20% slippage from sandwich alone.

Mitigations (rank by 2026 effectiveness):

1. Jito bundles (Solana) — submit with priority tip, atomic with no MEV window
2. Flashbots Protect RPC (Ethereum) — private mempool submission
3. MEV-protected DEX aggregators — Jupiter's slippage protection, 1inch Fusion, CoWSwap
4. Splitting orders — N smaller trades vs 1 large; reduces sandwich profitability per trade

If the mint is so illiquid that even split orders sandwich — that's the signal to skip the trade, not the signal to use better tooling.